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Secure and reliable computing remains an open problem. Just in the past
year, security vulnerabilities continued to be discovered in widely-used applica-
tions, and remote attacks that take advantage of these vulnerabilities can cause
an enormous amount of damage. Runtime monitoring is a promising approach
for addressing a wide range of security and reliability problems in a general
and transparent fashion. However, software-only approaches have high perfor-
mance overheads on applications, and using custom hardware to mitigate these
overheads can result in rigid schemes that are unable to adapt to new threats. In
this thesis, we will describe steps to build an architectural framework for run-
time monitoring that can address the drawbacks of previously proposed run-
time monitoring schemes by utilizing reconfigurable hardware and optimizing
for performance.
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This dissertation presents a co-processing architecture for security and reli-
ability. The architecture combines a traditional processing core with an on-chip
programmable fabric. Using an interface that can expose events on the main
processing core, the programmable fabric can be dynamically configured to per-
form monitoring operations on the main processing core. In this work, we will
show how such an architecture can perform runtime monitoring in an flexible
manner and with low performance overheads on monitored applications.
This research was motivated by the fact that individuals, government, and
corporations are increasingly more reliant on using computing technology [164]
to manage their assets, critical operations, and connectivity to others. This re-
liance leads to untold amounts of damage being done when an a system mal-
functions [164] or when an exploit is manifested [147]. Despite the efforts of
large corporations and research teams to attempt to address these exploits, soft-
ware vulnerabilities and attacks that take advantage of them are still preva-
lent [143, 142, 8].
Prior studies in runtime monitoring [110, 20, 51, 88, 101, 121] have shown
that it can defend against a broad range of errors. Runtime monitoring can
detect errors in the monitored application by tracking the internal state of indi-
vidual application as it executes and ensuring that certain invariants are always
met. In addition, fine-grained or instruction-grained runtime monitoring can be
very effective as it has several unique advantages. By monitoring at an instruc-
tion granularity [101, 88, 113, 121], fine-grained runtime monitoring has access
to highly detailed information regarding dynamic events in the application such
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as memory references, address computation, control transfers, and data move-
ment. This advantage allows runtime monitoring to be effectively used to en-
sure a wide range of security and reliability properties of the system. All told,
runtime monitoring can enable sophisticated attack detection and prevention
schemes such as fine-grained memory protection [94, 42, 37, 44, 161, 149], array
bound checking [44, 33], software debugging support [166], managed language
support such as garbage collection [76], hardware error detection [90], and
many others. Another advantage of fine-grained runtime monitoring is that,
compared to more coarse-grained monitoring [39] and analysis approaches,
software errors can be captured earlier and more accurately by fine-grained run-
time monitoring approaches.
As an example, researchers identified input channels such as the network
an important avenues for an attacker to enter a vulnerable system. Information
flow tracking [131, 102, 26, 43] was proposed as a way to defend against control
hijacking attacks that originate from the network by tainting data that is af-
fected by network inputs and tracking the use of tainted data. Information flow
tracking functions at the granularity of individual instructions to update book-
keeping (set metadata of destination operand based on source operands and the
executed instruction) and perform checks. Using metadata in the range of one
to several bits for each byte, information flow tracking approaches were shown
to be effective in defending against buffer overflow [106], format string [86],
cross-site scripting, SQL injection [132, 133], and double free errors.
Fine-grained runtime monitoring is not a new concept, there have been a
variety of previously proposed approaches for runtime monitoring. They can
be broadly categorized into software, multicore software, and custom hard-
2
ware approaches. These approaches show tension between performance and
the flexibility to adapt to monitoring needs. Runtime monitoring approaches
that were built as software platforms [64, 11, 87, 47, 88, 101, 102, 141] can monitor
each instruction of the monitored application by adding several instructions for
bookkeeping and checking. These approaches were flexible as they leveraged
the inherent programmability of general purpose processing cores. However,
these approaches presented very high (40-100X) performance overheads on the
monitored application [102]. Code optimizations that reduced the flexibility of
these approaches were able to reduce the overheads to a lower but still high 5-
12X [113, 96]. Such high overheads remained a problem for runtime monitoring
as they can hinder the usability of monitored applications.
Multicore and custom-hardware-based approaches were proposed as ways
to sustain the functionality of runtime monitoring while reducing their over-
heads on performance. Multicore approaches functioned by communicating
completed instructions from the core running the monitored application to an-
other processing core on a multiprocessing system [108, 125, 28, 162]. Multicore
monitoring approaches reduced the performance overheads of runtime moni-
toring but are inefficient as they incur the area and power overheads of another
dedicated processing core. These overheads can be reduced through the use of
specialized hardware accelerators that can perform the bookkeeping and check-
ing operations more efficiently [28, 146, 145]. Custom-hardware-based runtime
monitoring approaches can have the lowest performance overheads and are the
most efficient from an area and energy perspective. However, the adoption of
custom hardware can be an expensive proposition. Once fabricated, new usage
scenarios and zero-day exploits can quickly render algorithms that are imple-
mented in custom hardware obsolete. These high development costs and the
3
lack of flexibility makes the use of custom hardware rather impractical.
At a high level, it can be observed that there is a tradeoff between efficiency
and flexibility for runtime monitoring approaches. Custom-hardware-based
runtime monitoring approaches are the most efficient but have the least flexi-
bility. Software-instrumentation-based approaches have the most flexibility but
are the least efficient with high overheads on the monitored application. The
key to long-term impact for runtime monitoring is both high efficiency and high
flexibility for two reasons. The first reason is that monitoring functions that are
too slow will make the application unusable. The second reason is that the set
of important monitoring functions will likely change over time as security and
reliability requires change for new applications and usage scenarios. In addi-
tion, flexibility can be paramount as zero-day attacks target newly discovered
vulnerabilities; while protection schemes must change so as to protect against
these new threats.
1.1 Thesis Statement and Dissertation Roadmap
This dissertation investigates a co-processing platform that leverages reconfigurable
hardware for security and reliability monitoring, that can be a proxy for the flexibil-
ity of software-based monitoring approaches while being able to offer the efficiency of
custom hardware.
This research will illustrate the overall co-processing architecture in the con-
text of a single-core processor. We envision that the programmable runtime
monitoring framework can be extended to multi-core systems where each pro-
cessing core of the system would have its own reconfigurable accelerator for
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mapping runtime monitoring functions. The rest of the chapter will give an
overview of the remaining chapters in this thesis.
1.2 Fully programmable hardware accelerator for runtime
monitoring
First, we will first present an initial implementation of the co-processing ar-
chitecture named FlexCore that combines a traditional processing core with an
FPGA-like, bit-level reconfigurable fabric. FlexCore can be dynamically recon-
figured to perform any type of monitoring or computation that can fit within the
fabric. The use of reconfigurable hardware in this fashion deviates from tradi-
tional approaches that used reconfigurable hardware to accelerate certain types
of computation [150, 65]. The types of accelerators that can be supported by
FlexCore are control-coupled to the main computation, can independently ac-
cess shared memory, and interrupt the main processing core when monitoring
requirements are not met. One of the main benefits of this architecture are that
it allows hardware monitoring functions to be dynamically added to the system
long after the chip has been fabricated.
Our preliminary evaluation with FlexCore showed that the platform was
more efficient for runtime monitoring than another dedicated processing core;
and had lower performance overheads than pre-existing software-based ap-
proaches. The reconfigurable fabric was also quite flexible in being capable of
implementing several different types of monitoring approaches that fit within
the number of logic elements available on the fabric. To demonstrate that the
platform was effective in detecting security attacks, a prototype was built that
5
runs on a Xilinx FPGA board.
However, the relatively low throughput of reconfigurable fabric used in
FlexCore meant that the platform is unable to keep pace with modern, high
performance processing cores. In our analysis, we identified two high-level
sources of performance overheads: the difference in instruction throughput be-
tween the main processing core and accelerators on the reconfigurable fabric;
and contention between the main processing core and the accelerator for main
memory bandwidth. In the subsequent chapters, we describe techniques that
aim to address these sources of overhead.
1.3 Improved hardware fabric for runtime monitoring
For the throughput of the reconfigurable fabric, there appears to be a funda-
mental trade-off between efficiency and programmability. Programmability re-
quires additional hardware so as to provide for choice, but the extra hardware
results in longer delays and lower throughput. In Chapter 4, we introduce an
optimized co-processing architecture named Harmoni. Harmoni aims to im-
prove performance by carefully restricting the programmability of the recon-
figurable fabric such that it can still meet the demands of common monitoring
approaches.
In particular, we found that many of the instruction-grained runtime moni-
toring techniques are built on the notion of tagging, where metadata is bound
to program state, and monitoring functionality is tied to the management and
checking of metadata. Harmoni shares FlexCore’s ability to support monitor-
ing functions that are control-coupled to the main computation. However, by
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focusing specifically on monitoring approaches that make use of the tagging,
Harmoni is able to achieve higher operating clock frequencies of 1.25GHz on
the same 65nm technology generation. This higher clock frequency allows Har-
moni to keep pace with high-performance processors that are running at clock
frequencies of a few GHz and still have low overheads on performance.
1.4 Metadata caching
Runtime monitoring approaches that are built on the notion of tagging must
also managed metadata stored in shared memory. Using memory bandwidth
shared with the main processing core to access the metadata results in con-
tention overheads that will be exacerbated by large metadata values, which
may be needed for flexibility and functionality–desired characteristics of the
co-processing architecture. In Chapter 5, we found that metadata for runtime
monitoring approaches can exhibit the characteristics of sparsity, where many of
the accesses are unnecessary accesses for blank metadata values; and frequent
value locality, where only a few unique metadata values are actually used by a
runtime monitoring function over a period of time.
To take advantage of these characteristics, we introduce two optimizations to
improve the performance of on-chip metadata caches given a limited hardware
budget. First, we showed how a default-value filter named Non-Default Meta-
data (NDM) cache can remove a large percentage of accesses (and misses) to the
metadata caches. Next, we show how a dictionary-based compression approach
named Dynamic Metadata Compression (DMC) can take advantage of frequent
value locality to reduce accesses to memory without dramatically increasing the
7
size of the last-level metadata caches. Our evaluation of the combined approach
showed that the optimizations can reduce metadata cache misses and reduce the




This chapter summarizes some of the related works, which can be broadly
categorized into runtime monitoring schemes, generalized monitoring architec-
tures, and cache compression. While this chapter does not entirely cover all of
the work in these areas, it does highlight some of the main works and the trade-
offs that were made between convenience, efficiency, and error coverage. For
runtime monitoring schemes that address specific errors, we will also discuss
how they can be implemented by the proposed co-processing architecture.
2.1 Runtime Monitoring Schemes
2.1.1 Integrity Checking
Operation Checker
Read Instructions Control-flow Integrity
Compute Computational Integrity
Read and Write Memory Data-flow Integrity
Table 2.1: Basic computing operations and integrity checkers
Modern computing systems are typically built on modified Harvard archi-
tectures. Programs that run on these machines require the correct execution
of three basic classes of operations, which are shown in Table 2.1. The correct
functionality of these architectures can be verified by checking that these basic
operations have been correctly performed using a combination of operand data,
metadata, and arithmetic operations for each. Integrity checking schemes have
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been proposed to check these basic operations by attempting to infer a set of
rules regarding programmer intentions and then using runtime checks to verify
the adherence to these rules.
For instructions, control-flow integrity schemes [105, 1, 90, 91] statically ana-
lyze source code at compile time to build control-flow graphs (CFG) that repre-
sent valid executions of the program. Using the results of static analysis, control-
flow integrity schemes can embed metadata in the form of labels in the basic
blocks of an instrumented program. At runtime, these labels can be used to
check whether basic block transitions correspond to valid edges in the statically-
determined CFG for the application [90, 91, 105]. These checks allow control-
flow integrity schemes to detect a wide-range of control-hijacking attacks [106],
which can manifest as the transfer of control to attacker-injected code or privi-
leged functions in standard libraries. However, control-flow integrity schemes
are limited by the imprecision of static analysis, which must make approxima-
tions (such as context-insensitive or flow-insensitive analysis) that reduce preci-
sion so as to allow the analysis to complete in reasonable time and space. Hence,
monitoring at the granularity of basic blocks can be too coarse: if static analysis
tools are unable to identify basic blocks at a fine granularity, errors that cause a
monitored application to jump into the middle of a basic block would be able to
bypass the preceding checks.
For compute, computational integrity schemes have been proposed that use
a small hardware checker to verify that the computation was performed cor-
rectly by the components of the larger processing core [10, 90]. For example,
Argus [90] used a hardware checker that is tightly coupled to the functional
units of a processing core to check computed results. Rather than duplicating
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the functional units being checked, the hardware checkers proposed in Argus
were simplified by only having to verify certain properties of the computation.
As another example, DIVA [10] was proposed as a more comprehensive hard-
ware checker for the processing core. The checker is attached to the commit
stage of the processor and checks that committed instructions were performed
correctly by the processing core. For permanent stuck-at faults, DIVA can act
as a redundant hardware module that can assume the responsibilities of the
processor’s data-path. While the processor pipeline will operate with lower
performance because of the slower DIVA checker, the system will still function
correctly and provide graceful degradation instead of hard-stop failure behav-
ior. In this work, we will demonstrate the functionality of the co-processing
architecture by showing how a computational-integrity checker can be imple-
mented on the co-processing fabric by building an expressive interface that can
communicate operand values to the checker.
For memory reads and writes, data-flow integrity schemes [23, 3, 159] have
been proposed that attempt to check that the values read by the processing core
matches programmer intentions. DFI [23] statically analyzes the monitored ap-
plication using points-to and reaching-definitions analysis to determine the set
of instructions that will normally write each memory location and then instru-
ments the program binary with checks for set membership on dynamic write
instructions. These checks are facilitated at runtime by instrumented operations
that use metadata to track the ID of the last instruction to write to each location.
This data structure is then used by the runtime checking operations to confirm
that the values read by consuming instructions were written by legal producing
instructions. When evaluated with SPEC CPU 2000 benchmarks, DFI had very
high performance (104%) and memory usage (50%) overheads. To reduce the
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high performance overheads of DFI, WIT [3] compressed the encoding of in-
structions that are allowed to write to a particular memory location by pairing
them using a small set of unique values (or colors). In a sense, WIT can detect
illegal writes by checking that the write instruction’s metadata, which encodes
the color, matches the metadata of the target memory location that the instruc-
tion is attempting to write. However, similar to control-flow integrity, dataflow
integrity schemes are still limited by the precision of static analysis in finding
memory errors in the monitored application. The inaccuracy of static analy-
sis also means that data-flow integrity schemes often require complementary
mechanisms [3] to improve error coverage.
As a simplified form of data-flow integrity, memory integrity schemes [10,
62, 130, 166, 91] check that memory operations were correctly performed by the
main processing core. DIVA [10] checks the correctness of memory operations
by re-executing them. Argus [91] protects against errors that cause a load or
store to access the wrong word by XORing the address and data and using par-
ity to protect the XOR result. AEGIS [130] operated under the premise that ma-
licious entities had physical access to a computing system and hence everything
outside of the CPU die can be considered untrustworthy. AEGIS verified that
data stored in memory were untampered with by using a tree-based integrity
verification scheme to build a complete hash of memory contents.
Many of the essential elements for a general purpose monitoring platform
can be discerned from a study of the related works in integrity checking. In par-
ticular, we will demonstrate how the co-processing platform presented in this
thesis can make use of an expressive interface from the processing core to the
checker, metadata for application data, and programmable hardware to imple-
12
ment many of the integrity-checking schemes presented in this section. Further,
we will show how programmable hardware support can be leveraged to per-
form bookkeeping and checking operations at runtime and do so with perfor-
mance overheads on monitored applications that are comparable to approaches
that use custom hardware.
2.1.2 Return Address Protection
Buffer overflows are well-known software-errors [115] that continue to manifest
in zero-day security exploits [14, 86, 162]. Buffer overflow errors occur when un-
sanitized program inputs are used by a vulnerable application to write beyond
the boundaries of a program buffer. When the buffer is allocated in the program
stack, the error can lead to the corruption of sensitive data adjacent to the buffer
such as the function’s return address. By overwriting the buffer with code or
data of the attacker’s choosing and corrupting the return address, a malicious
attack can hijack control of the vulnerable program [106].
Because corrupting pointers such as the return address is essential to the
success of typical buffer overflow attacks [131], many runtime monitoring tech-
niques were developed to counter these attacks by protecting the return ad-
dress. StackGuard [39] and ProPolice [68] proposed to modify application bi-
naries by placing canaries next to the return address. When overflows occur
with canaries, the canary would be corrupted (along with the return address),
and the overflow can be detected by checking that the value of the canary was
unaltered at a function return. However, canaries are an ad-hoc mechanism to
protect against specific buffer overflow exploits that linearly overwrite adjacent
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data [21]. Given details of the canary implementation, an attackers can also
”guess” the canary value and escape detection.
Other return address protection mechanisms attempted to better protect ca-
nary values. PointGuard [38] proposed to protect return addresses and function
pointers by encrypting them when they are stored in memory. This approach
reduces the probability of a successful attack, as attacks are no longer able to
control the destination of function returns unless the encryption key was also
known. Libsafe and Libverify [14] is a two-step approach that attempted to pro-
tect against buffer overflows and protect the return address. First, Libsafe in-
tercepted unsafe C library functions for memory and string copies and checked
that they cannot cause overflows that can reach the return address. Next, Lib-
verify makes a backup copy of the return address on function entry and checks
that the return address still matches the backup copy when the function returns.
To prevent canary values from being ”guessed,” fine-grained memory protec-
tion mechanisms [64, 122, 101] can be used to implement canaries that trigger
protection faults when they are written to. For example, fine-grained memory
protection may be implemented using two-bits of metadata for each memory
word to track allocated/initialized status; when the canary is marked unallo-
cated, a malicious overwrite that writes to the canary would be detected as a
return address protection error [64]. Despite the inherent limitations of canary-
based approaches, they can still effectively protect specific data in the instru-
mented application. Further, we will demonstrate in the later chapters how
such techniques can be also implemented on the co-processing architecture pro-
posed in this thesis.
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2.1.3 Information Flow
Despite the wealth of works available in protecting the return address, its cor-
ruption is just one of the many ways that a security exploit can manifest. In-
formation flow tracking techniques aim to protect against a wider range of se-
curity exploits by targeting the final step, which is to coerce a compromised
application to jump to code of the attacker’s choosing. Also known as tainting,
information flow tracking techniques function by tainting untrusted data and
then checking that tainted data are not used as pointers in security sensitive op-
erations [131, 138]. By exposing an interface to taint information to user-level
applications, which can check the taint of arguments to sensitive function calls,
information flow tracking can be used to detect even high level semantic errors
such as command injection and cross-site scripting [103, 156, 43].
Tainting approaches built on software instrumentation frameworks [102,
122] can run unmodified program binaries but incur performance overheads
of as much as 100X. Although as much as 40% of the overheads [156] of tainting
could be attributed to the use of heavyweight binary instrumentation frame-
works [101], even with aggressive optimizations to eliminate unnecessary or
redundant checks, overheads for serial software-based approach are still of-
ten 100% or more [156, 113]. Alternatively, hardware-based taint tracking ap-
proaches have been proposed that offload tainting operations as much as pos-
sible using dedicated registers, memory, and computational resources for taint
metadata [41, 131, 43]. In this thesis, we will also show how taint tracking can
be mapped to a the proposed co-processing architecture and have average per-
formance overheads of less than 10% on monitored applications.
One of the limitations of taint tracking is that it must make difficult trade-
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offs between false positives and false negatives. Taint tracking approaches have
been proposed that address tainted data pointer errors [131, 41, 26, 43]. How-
ever, these works must also take measures to stop the propagation of taint when
branch conditions are also tainted or the spread of taint may explode [34], which
leads to undesirable false positives. To reduce false positives, the program may
need to be recompiled [131], or assumptions about programmer intentions [26]
must be used to proactively untaint application data. However, attacks that cor-
rupt data throw control dependencies may still be able to subvert the security
of a target system [29] and lead to false negatives.
Taint tracking can be viewed as a simplified subset of information flow con-
trol that only allows for two levels of privilege: trustworthy or not [110]. In a
broader sense, Information flow control techniques attempt to control the move-
ment of data in a system. For example, multi-level security policies such as Bell-
LaPadula (BLP) or Biba [18] use privilege levels and policies on the movement
of data between privilege levels that prohibit the dissemination of information
from low to high levels of privilege. Under such policies, when a subject reads
an object that contains low-integrity information, then the privilege level of the
subject is lowered to the minimum of the object’s and its own. Once its priv-
ilege is lowered, the subject is no longer allowed to write to locations that re-
quire higher levels of privilege (including output channels such as the network
interface), thus preventing the dissemination of the sensitive information it has
read. Many system have been proposed that were built on similar policies by
creating explicit labels for all data, programs, storage, and I/O channels of a sys-
tem [144, 126, 160, 161]. In this thesis, we will also show how information flow
control techniques can be implemented on the proposed co-processing architec-
ture. Further, we will also show how the larger and more expressive metadata
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values that are needed to encode the labels can be supported in an efficient man-
ner.
2.1.4 Bounds Checking
One drawback of information flow tracking is that the checks take place after
data has been corrupted, this necessitate fail-stop behavior on a detected er-
ror. Bounds checking techniques attempt to detect a similar class of errors but
do so before sensitive data can become corrupted. This can allow application
that require high availability to be unimpeded by the manifestation of such er-
rors [114].
For speed and efficiency, C and C++ provide programmers the freedom to
perform arbitrary arithmetic operations on pointers. This speed is reflected
in the C standard library, where bulk copy operations (such as strcpy(),
strcat(), sprintf(), and gets()) do not check that the destination buffers
are large enough to hold the copied data. Programming mistakes in the use
of these features can lead to buffer overflows [106]. To retrofit pointer safety,
researcher have recognized that an important invariant of the C/C++ program-
ming languages is that the intended referent (delimited by the memory address
boundaries of the object) of each pointer are typically invariant over the lifetime
of the pointer [63]. Bounds checking techniques build on this invariant and in-
strument the application at compile time to track the intended referent of each
pointer and to check pointers when they are dereferenced. As is the case with
other monitoring techniques discussed in this chapter, bounds checking tech-
niques also must make difficult trade-offs and can be divided into two distinct
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types.
Object-based bounds checking techniques track the base and bounds infor-
mation of allocated objects in a centralized data structure [77, 117, 157, 47, 4].
Object-based referent checking techniques offer the advantages of being back-
wards compatible with the calling conventions of pre-existing library functions
and being able to check for temporal memory errors. The seminal work pro-
posed by Jones and Kelly [77] stored the base and bounds of live objects in
a a splay tree that is looked up using the pointer’s value. However, Jone’s
and Kelly’s proposed approach had the drawbacks of high overheads on per-
formance and false positives. Because C and C++ allow a pointer to tem-
porarily move out-of-bounds without being dereferenced, as is the case in
loop termination conditions, Jones and Kelly’s approach suffered false posi-
tives by checking the result of pointer arithmetic operations. CRED [117] re-
solved the false positives in Jones and Kelly’s approach by retaining informa-
tion about out-of-bounds pointers in a separate data structure and checking
pointers when they are de-referenced instead. When out-of-bounds pointers
return in-bounds later in the program, the additional data structure proposed
in CRED allows the pointer’s bounds information to be recovered. In addi-
tion, previous works showed how the performance overheads of object-based
bounds checking techniques can be reduced by restricting the scope of pointers
that must be checked [48, 117, 13], or using static analysis to remove redundant
checks [19, 48]. However, because objects in the centralized data structure is rep-
resented by its start address (and this start address may be shared with an array
inside a struct), one of the main drawbacks of object-based approaches is that
it is unable to detect sub-object overflows. This drawback renders object-based
bounds checking approaches incomplete as solutions for memory safety.
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In contrast to object-based bounds checking approaches, pointer-based
bounds checking approaches [11, 108, 75, 99, 97, 33] semantically change point-
ers into objects that also carry base and bounds information about its intended
referent. By allowing multiple pointers to be associated with the same object but
have different bounds, ”fat pointer” techniques are able to address the incom-
pleteness of object-based bounds checking approaches. However, by increasing
the size of pointer data, ”fat pointer” techniques render the instrumented appli-
cation incompatible with pre-existing library functions by changing the memory
layout and the semantics of function calls. Some of this compatibility can be re-
stored by mapping the bounds information for pointers to metadata [44], which
makes them also more conducive to hardware implementation. Fat pointers can
also be viewed as adding capabilities addressing to pointers, where pointers
carry information regarding the address range that they can access and privi-
leges they have on the data. The CHERI Capability Model [151] demonstrated
how tagged memory and a MIPS co-processor that is attached to the compute
and memory access stages of the processor pipeline can be used to implement
capability-based addressing and complement the protections afforded by vir-
tual memory. By using 1-bit of metadata to distinguish between normal data
and capabilities and extensive compiler support to instrument applications with
capabilities checking, CHERI is able to achieve fairly low performance over-
heads (20%) on monitored applications. In this thesis, we will show how a sim-
ilar hardware bounds checking approach can be mapped to the co-processing
architecture proposed in this work.
However, pointer-based bounds checking approaches also comes with
drawbacks in terms of being unable to check for temporal errors. Unlike object-
based referent checking approaches that can use its centralized data struc-
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tures to revoke objects that are deallocated, pointer-based referent checking ap-
proaches such as Cyclone [75] and CCured [97] are only able to protect against
temporal memory errors if a garbage collection mechanism is is available. This
reliance on garbage collection makes the performance of a program unpre-
dictable and negates some of the performance advantages of the C program-
ming language.
2.1.5 Discussion
From the short introduction to some of the past works on runtime monitoring,
it can be observed that runtime monitoring techniques are largely ad-hoc and
have trade-offs that limit their use. The existing approaches have been shown to
be effective in defending against known exploits, but they also have drawbacks
stemming from the need to avoid false positives or having false negatives. Once
an approach becomes more widely used and therefore scrutinized, their draw-
backs can become avenues for future exploits to target. Hence, the set of impor-
tant monitoring functions will likely change over time as new zero-day exploits
emerge and protection mechanisms are adapted to defend against them.
2.2 Runtime Monitoring Architectures
2.2.1 System Call Interposition
For reusability, large systems are often built up from generic helper modules
and third party libraries, which may contain buggy components or security vul-
20
nerabilities. To sandbox these and other components of an application, system
call interposition frameworks were proposed as mechanisms that can check for
anomalous behavior. In theory, these techniques can be an effective last line of
defense as many software attacks can only effect lasting damage to the system
through the use of system calls [54, 73, 111]. Further, these frameworks typically
operate on the principle of least privilege, which permits programs to use only
system resources that are necessary for its legitimate purpose.
Fraser et al [54] created a platform for system call interposition with mech-
anisms for tracking system call history and for reading and writing system call
arguments and return values. Multiple works proposed spawning dedicated
processes that perform the monitoring using process tracing facilities available
in the operating system to intercept and interpose system calls [59, 73]. These
approaches deny all system calls by default and use explicit white lists to de-
termine what can be allowed. Systrace [111] generated the same white-listing
policies in a more automated manner by running the target application with
known-good inputs and recording the system calls that are needed.
Because system calls require a long-latency context switch, the overheads
of the extra analysis that is performed by system call interposition techniques
have a negligible impact on performance [59, 73]. However, the use of white
lists limits system call interposition techniques to programs that do not legiti-
mately need many privileges [59] and do not contain covert channels [57]. Fur-
ther, the coarse-granularity of checking can result in very long latencies between
the occurrence of an error and when it is detected. In contrast to the coarse
granularity of system call interposition, the monitoring approaches that can be
implemented by the co-processing architecture proposed in this thesis will fo-
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cus on the implementation of monitoring techniques that can be invoked at a
finer granularity of individual instructions. This fine granularity of invocation
can provide for checkers that can capture software errors earlier and more accu-
rately than coarse-grained approaches.
2.2.2 Multi-variant Systems
Multi-variant systems are general purpose execution frameworks that are built
to detect errors in an application by concurrently running multiple variants of
the same application in lockstep. The variants are designed to produce the same
result given the same inputs, but an error in any one variant will cause it to devi-
ate in behavior with regards to the other variants. For example, N-version pro-
gramming [25, 12] proposed to have teams of developers, who do not interact
during the programming process, independently generate functionally equiv-
alent programs from the same specification. During runtime, all variants are
blocked at specific points of the execution, for example at system calls [40, 119],
so that a monitoring process can examine the intermediate states to detect be-
havioral deviations.
Multi-variant systems have been extended to monitoring for security errors
by judiciously selecting the properties to change [72], which determine the types
of security errors that can be detected. Orchestra [119] used automatic program
transformation techniques to generate variants where the program stack grows
in opposite directions [118] so as to detect stack smashing attacks. DieHard [16]
used program stack and heap layout randomization techniques in different vari-
ants so as to probabilistically avoid buffer overflow and format string errors.
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N-variant systems [40] leveraged a combination of memory layout randomiza-
tion [17, 109, 116] and instruction set randomization [15, 79] to detect arbitrary
memory overwrites and code injection errors. Other properties, such as system
call randomization, register randomization, library entry point randomization,
canaries [39], and padding between stack and heap variables [67] can also be
leveraged in some combination to detect specific symptoms of security errors.
For security and reliability, multi-variant systems trade off performance,
power, hardware, and software development costs. Multi-variant systems built
on on multi-core clusters [25, 12] can greatly increase the power consumption
and hardware costs to run an application. Further, the need to have multiple
differing replicas can potentially increase the cost of software design [12]. In
contrast to multi-variant systems, the co-processing architecture proposed in
this thesis will implement checkers that can target specific aspects of the com-
putation. This choice of design allows the checkers to be simpler and more
efficient than those that are implemented by multi-variant systems.
2.2.3 Monitoring Platforms
Software-based runtime monitoring approaches such as those that are built on
dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) frameworks [70, 101] are effective in aid-
ing the development of new monitoring schemes and being backwards compat-
ible. However, the need to invoke instrumented software handlers that perform
monitoring operations for each instruction of a monitored application can re-
sult in very high performance overheads for DBI-based approaches. Log-Based
Architectures (LBA) [27] proposed to mitigate these overheads by taking advan-
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tage of process-level parallelism. LBA proposed to communicate events in the
monitored application to a separate processing core that can perform the mon-
itoring operations in parallel. However, LBA incurs the full area and power
overheads of another general-purpose processing core. Alternatively, Dynamic
Instruction Stream Editing (DISE) [36] proposed to mitigate these overheads by
taking advantage of instruction-level parallelism. DISE modified the decoder of
a superscalar processing core such that it can be used to inject instructions that
perform operations such as runtime monitoring into the dynamic instruction
stream of a monitored application. While LBA and DISE are both able to avoid
the performance overheads of DBI, they still incur high performance overheads
(50% or more) on monitored applications. In this thesis, we will design and
evaluate alternative approaches that have less area and power overheads than
LBA, and lower performance overheads than both.
Other works have proposed to mitigate the performance overheads of run-
time monitoring by using hardware support to memorize and filter software
handler invocations. These filtering approaches can improve performance by
handling previously-observed or common monitoring operations in hardware
and maintain high flexibility by invoking the software handler in exceptional
cases.
FlexiTaint [145] filtered software handlers that perform information flow
tracking using a programmable Taint Propagation Cache (TPC) that was added
to after the commit stage of the processing pipeline. The TPC memorizes the
outcomes of previous invocations of software handlers and uses a combination
of the input metadata and opcode to update the value of metadata that are 0
to 16-bits in size. For a small TPC cache of 4KB, the performance overheads
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of information flow tracking were reduced to 3.7%. In contrast to FlexiTaint,
we propose to build a more general purpose co-processing architecture that can
support a wider variety of runtime monitoring approaches and do so with low
performance overheads for each.
FADE and PUMP expanded on prior works (and the work in this thesis)
by proposing general-purpose monitoring architectures that use rule caches to
minimize software handler invocations. FADE [55] was proposed as a general
purpose design for filtering monitoring events from a software handler. For a
variety of runtime monitoring approaches, FADE showed that the average mon-
itoring load consisted largely of redundant operations such as stack updates and
rarely exceeded one instruction per cycle. Using a metadata cache and a rule ta-
ble, FADE was shown to be able to filter out 84-99% of instructions and reduced
the performance overheads on monitored applications to 20-80%. In the limit,
hardware filtering approaches can be viewed as software-defined engines for
metadata processing. While metadata can be accessed and metadata process-
ing can be performed by hardware, the policies for metadata processing are still
largely controlled by software, especially when metadata are pointers to larger
data structures. Programmable Unit for Metadata Processing (PUMP) [45] was
proposed as a way to implement such a software-defined engine. PUMP was
a RISC co-processor with tagged memory, registers, and caches for metadata
processing. PUMP utilizes rule caches that memorize that prior outcome of
software handler invocations and dedicated metadata caches and memory for
metadata propagation. To provide utmost generality, the rule caches in PUMP
can map between the instruction opcode and up to five input tags to two output
tags. To demonstrate the effectiveness of PUMP in implementing a wide range
of monitoring approaches, example approaches such as information flow track-
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ing, execute-disable, bounds checking, and control-flow integrity were built and
evaluated on the co-processing architecture.
In this thesis, we will attempt to minimize performance overheads of run-
time monitoring by mainly focusing on hardware techniques that can transpar-
ently perform bookkeeping and checks on the co-processing fabric. By taking
advantage of the configurability of the co-processing fabric, these techniques
can have the lowest overheads on performance. However, to retain flexibil-
ity and to increase performance, we also adapted a similar approach of in-
voking software handlers for complex monitoring operations and using a pro-
grammable tables to memorize the outcomes and filter redundant software han-
dler invocations.
2.3 Cache Compression
In Chapter 5, we will study the effects of optimizations on the metadata cache
hierarchy that were adapted from prior works in cache and memory compres-
sion. In this section, we describe some of these related works in cache and mem-
ory compression.
Previous research in runtime monitoring have shown that metadata for var-
ious types of runtime monitoring approaches have good spatial [131, 127, 137]
or temporal locality [161, 145, 96]. Spatial locality, which refers to large chunks
of contiguous application data having identical metadata, is a characteristic of
metadata for information flow tracking [131, 127, 137]. Prior research has lever-
aged this characteristic to use one instance of metadata to represent a large
chunk of application data in memory [131, 127] or in the on-chip metadata
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caches [137]. Unlike small tags, which have higher spatial locality, we aimed to
optimize for large tags, which have more permutations and thus lower spatial
locality. In this work, we proposed NDM cache to take advantage of sparsity to
filter accesses to the metadata caches. This makes NDM orthogonal and comple-
mentary to prior works such as the range cache [137], which aimed to optimized
the storage of metadata in on-chip caches. In addition, temporal locality, which
refers to few unique metadata values being utilized in each phase of application
execution, is a characteristic that has been demonstrated for metadata managed
by array bounds checking [96], information flow control [161], and informa-
tion flow tracking [145]. Those works [96, 161, 145] took advantage of temporal
locality to speedup otherwise slow checks by caching checks for the most fre-
quently observed metadata values and reusing them for the same operation and
operands. In this work, we found that metadata values exhibit excellent tem-
poral locality. In contrast to previous works, which take advantage of temporal
locality to memorize the outcome of metadata checks, we took advantage of
temporal locality to optimize the storage of metadata values in on-chip caches.
Prior works have also evaluated compressing data stored in main memory.
For lossless on-chip data compression, Dusser and Seznec [49] showed that null
data blocks comprise a significant fraction of application data in memory, by di-
viding the address space into strictly null or non-null data, the null data blocks
can be represented using only one bit of memory. Several authors [80, 30, 158, 6]
observed that application data exhibit repeating patterns. By representing these
patterns using fewer bits, they are able to increase compression ratios by two-
to threefold. Other works [139, 24] proposed to take advantage of the statisti-
cal redundancy of data streams by using well-known compression algorithms
such as LZW to compress data blocks that are stored in caches or memory. In
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contrast to these works on main memory compression, we aimed to compress
data stored in on-chip caches so as to make more effective use of limited on-chip
storage and off-chip bandwidth.
However, Shannon’s source coding theorem also indicates that not all data
can be compressed. Given that uncompressible data may actually exacerbate
data bandwidth and storage requirements of cache compression techniques,
Lee [84, 85] and Almadeen [5] evaluated systems where compression is adap-
tively enabled depending on whether it benefits performance. In this chapter,
we simplified the problem of storing both uncompressed data from compressed
data by partitioning them into distinct halves. Other proposed approaches can
similarly reuse the same storage medium for both types of data, at the cost of
lower compression ratios. For example, Yang et al [158] proposed a compressed
cache design that allocates additional tags for cache lines such that they can
either hold one uncompressed cache line or two cache lines that have been com-
pressed to at least half their original length. This bounds the compression ratio
to at most two. Similar to the approach in this work, Chen et al [24] proposed
to dynamically partition the L2 cache into sections of different compressibili-
ties. An attempt is made to compress each cache line that is brought into the
L2 cache, and the line is placed into the relevant partition depending on the
compression outcome. However, such rigid partitions can lead to internal frag-
mentation when data cannot be exactly compressed into distinct granularities.
Indirect-index caches [123, 61, 120] were presented as a possible solution by al-
lowing tags to be decoupled from data via a level of indirection, at the cost of
longer access delays because they can no longer occur in parallel.
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CHAPTER 3
FLEXIBLE AND EFFICIENT RUN-TIME MONITORING ON
RECONFIGURABLE HARDWARE
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present an architectural framework, named FlexCore, that
features a general processing core augmented with an on-chip accelerator fab-
ric. The accelerator fabric in this framework is composed of bit-level reconfig-
urable logic that’s organized similarly to typical island-style FPGAs. The fabric
can be configured for a hardware implementation of logic for any computation
that can fit inside the fabric. FlexCore is designed to enable a large class of
run-time monitoring techniques to run efficiently and in a transparent fashion
for applications running on processing core. A new runtime monitoring tech-
nique, even if it was not known at the time the processor was fabricated, can
be implemented in hardware on the accelerator fabric and run with greater effi-
ciency than purely software approaches. The reconfigurable fabric also enables
the monitoring functions to be customized for each processor instance and each
application.
The design of the FlexCore architecture was motivated by the fact that ex-
isting proposals for run-time monitoring suffer from drawbacks of either high
overheads or low flexibility. Software-based approaches in runtime monitoring
leverage the inherent programmability of general purpose processors to imple-
ment monitoring operations in software by instrumenting each instruction of
the monitored application with several additional instructions for bookkeep-
ing and checking [102]. Software-based approaches offer very high flexibility
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in allowing monitoring functions to be modified long after the chip has been
fabricated, however, this flexibility comes at the cost of drastically reduced
performance for the monitored application. A software implementation for
DIFT monitoring on a single core is reported to have an average slowdown
of 24X [102], and even with aggressive optimizations, this overhead is still as
high as 3.6X [113]. Running the monitoring operations on another processing
core of a CMP [125, 28, 162] can lower the performance overheads but this is
rather inefficient as it requires more than twice the power. Further, a general
purpose processing core can be a poor match for run-time monitoring schemes
that do not need to fully replicate the computation [10] or just perform simple
checks [131]. As an example, dynamic information flow tracking [131, 41, 43]
has primary operations of propagating and checking the tag of the operands
used by a subset of instructions executed by the monitored application. These
checks can be performed using logical operations for just a few bits; a full 32/64-
bit general purpose processing pipeline would be over-provisioned in terms of
cost and power to perform these operations. On the other hand, specialized
hardware techniques [131, 146, 145] are the most efficient for implementing run-
time monitoring operations, but are inflexible and cannot adapt to changes in
its environment.
In the FlexCore architecture, we propose to add an on-chip reconfigurable
fabric to a traditional processing core to create a highly flexible and efficient
runtime monitoring platform. We believe that a bit-level reconfigurable fabric
can be better suited for run-time monitoring compared to software running on
traditional processing cores as many monitoring techniques for security, relia-
bility, and programmability require mostly bit-level logical operations. Further,
the fabric can be dynamically reconfigured to implement the logic of any mon-
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itoring function that fits within the fabric, giving the system the flexibility it
needs to response to changes in its usage or environment. Hence, the FlexCore
architecture can provide a solution that bridges the tradeoffs made between spe-
cialized hardware and software instrumentation-based approaches for runtime
monitoring.
However, the inefficiency of the reconfigurable fabric compared to custom
logic was a problem that needed to be overcome. A circuit that is implemented
on a FPGA can have much longer critical path delays than a custom implemen-
tation [81]. Therefore, we needed to identify techniques to hide the inefficiencies
of the reconfigurable fabric and to increase its throughput so that it would not
impede the progress of the general purpose processing core. To accomplish this
goal, we used a small instruction queue between the general purpose process-
ing core to decouple operations on accelerator fabric from the monitored ap-
plication. Next, we added control registers to the main processing core so that
instructions that are not relevant to the monitoring operation being performed
are filtered out and not forwarded to the accelerator fabric. Finally, we selec-
tively incorporated custom logic in the reconfigurable fabric to perform com-
mon operations that are inefficient to implement on a bit-level reconfigurable
fabric.
To evaluate the proposed architecture, we built a prototype of FlexCore
based on a simple in-order microprocessor (Leon3) and studied the area, power
consumption, and performance on 65nm process technology. Evaluation results
of the prototype demonstrate that the FlexCore architecture can indeed support
a range of runtime monitoring functions with different requirements and op-
erations, including functions that protect against uninitialized memory reads,
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buffer overflow, control hijacking, and soft errors in the processor’s data-path.
Results from a study using synthesis tools showed that the interfaces added
to the main processing core to support communication with the reconfigurable
fabric have minimal impact on the operating frequency of the main computing
core. In terms of the silicon area, FlexCore adds about 0.3mm2 for dedicated
hardware components and all evaluated extensions can fit in a 0.4mm2 FPGA
fabric, which represents a small increase for modern processors that are tens of
mm2.
The experimental results also suggest that run-time monitoring on FlexCore
is far more efficient than software implementations in terms of both perfor-
mance and power consumption, and can almost match the performance of ASIC
implementations for processors with moderate frequencies. For example, array
bounds checks can be performed by the reconfigurable fabric with a 18% aver-
age slowdown and 22% additional power consumption while an ASIC imple-
mentation results in a 8% slowdown with 8% additional power consumption.
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) on the FlexCore design incurs a
17% slowdown with a 21% power overhead compared to the 5% and 6% over-
heads of an ASIC. Overall, the prototype implementation shows that the Flex-
Core architecture is promising direction for the creation of a platform for flexible
and efficient implementation of hardware runtime monitoring features.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the co-
processing model and show how example monitoring functions can map to the
accelerator fabric. Section 3.3 presents the design of the FlexCore architecture.
Section 3.4 describes the details of our prototype implementations and how ex-
ample runtime monitoring functions map to the fabric. Section 3.5 studies the
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performance, area, and power consumption of our prototype runtime monitor-
ing functions in both FlexCore and full ASIC implementations.
3.2 Co-Processing Model for Run-Time Monitoring
This section presents the computation model used by FlexCore for the fine-
grained run-time monitoring. In the ensuing discussions, we will use the term















Figure 3.1: Computation model for fine-grained runtime monitoring
Figure 3.1 shows the high-level model of the computational model used by
FlexCore. In the figure, dark (blue) blocks represent the co-processor and light
(yellow) blocks represent the monitored computation. Conceptually, the co-
processor performs fine-grained monitoring by observing each instruction that
is executed by the monitored application and performing one or more opera-
tions for each instruction. In terms of operations, the co-processor can perform
a combination of performing bookkeeping and checking for invariants of the
33
computation. For bookkeeping, the co-processor maintains meta-data that is of-
ten be disjoint from the program state to allow it to acutely track the properties
of the computation. For invariant checking, if a check fails, the co-processor will
have provisions to allow it to communicate to the main processing core that a
problem has occurred. From computational model, it can be observed a run-
time monitoring function can be characterized at a high level by its meta-data,
instruction-specific operations, and software interfaces. Here, we briefly define
each characteristics and its implication for the FlexCore design.
• Meta-data: Runtime monitoring functions may need meta-data for all com-
putational state that is affected by the monitored application. For tra-
ditional cores, computational state is typically held and communicated
through architectural registers and addressable memory. Hence, the co-
processor needs to be able to have the capability to maintain metadata for
each register on the main processing core and for each minimally address-
able memory location used by the monitored application.
• Operations: One or more fine-grained or per-instructions operations are pos-
sibly necessary for performing the bookkeeping and checking operations
required by the monitoring function. The operations performed will vary
between different types of runtime monitoring functions, therefore the ac-
celerator fabric must be flexible in being able to support the various types
of computation that is required by the operations. Aside from decoded
properties of the executed instruction, there is typically no logical depen-
dence between data computed by the monitored application and meta-
data maintained by the runtime monitoring function. Hence, the runtime
monitoring operations can be decoupled from the main computation and
be performed concurrently with subsequent instructions in the monitored
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application. However, if a check does fail, then the hardware must have
the ability to undo the effects of the instruction that triggered the failed
check.
• Software interfaces: The runtime monitoring functions need to be able to
communicate with the main processing core the results of certain checks.
Simultaneously, the main processing core will need an interface to com-
municate completed instructions and some amount of decoded operands
and relevant processor state to the monitoring function. In addition, the
main processing core, in privileged mode, will need to be able to control
and program the reconfigurable accelerator fabric. However, we antic-
ipate that these programming and control interfaces will be used infre-
quently and need not be exceptionally expedient.
3.2.1 Example Monitoring Extensions
To further flesh out details of the processing model, we studied past works in
hardware runtime monitoring and identified a subset of example monitoring
functions as candidates for implementation on the proposed FlexCore platform.
This subsection will show how those example runtime monitoring functions
map to FlexCore’s co-processing architecture.
Table 3.1 summarizes the operations of four example extensions: UMC,
DIFT, BC, and SEC. Section 3.4 describes more details of each extension and
its implementation.
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Extension Meta-Data Transparent Operations SW Visible Operations
UMC [64]
1-bit per MEM word Set metadata on a store Clear REG/MEM metadata
Check metadata on a load Exception when a check fails
DIFT [131]
1-bit per REG Propagate metadata on ALU/LD/ST Set REG/MEM metadata
1-bit per MEM word Check metadata on BR/JMP Clear REG/MEM metadata
Set registers on co-processor
Exception when a check fails
BC [33]
4-bits per REG Propagate metadata on ALU/LD/ST Set REG/MEM metadata
8-bits per MEM word Check REG metadata against Clear REG/MEM metadata
the MEM metadata on a load/store Exception when a check fails
SEC [10, 90] Check ALU results Exception when a check fails
Table 3.1: Example FlexCore runtime monitoring functions. UMC: Unini-
tialized Memory Check. DIFT: Dynamic Information Flow
Tracking, BC: Array Bound Checking, SEC: Soft Error Checking.
Uninitialized Memory Checking (UMC) Uninitialized Memory Check
(UMC) is an approach based on HeapMon [125], which was proposed as a way
to detect programming mistakes where a program variable is not initialized be-
fore use. In our implementation of UMC, the co-processor maintains a one-bit
metadata for each byte of memory in the monitored application to track the two
possible states that the memory byte could be in: 0-Uninitialized or 1-Initialized.
The main processing core uses new instructions added to the ISA for writing to
FlexCore metadata will initialize (set to 0) the metadata of each byte of memory
that is allocated by functions such as malloc() or deallocated on a call to free().
Transparently on each store instruction executed by the monitored application,
the co-processor will set the metadata for each memory byte that is written to
to an Initialized state. On each load instruction, the co-processor will check that
the metadata of each memory byte that is loaded does not have metadata corre-
sponding to an Uninitialized state.
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) Dynamic Information Flow
Tracking DIFT) is based on previous works [131, 41, 102, 43] that detect errors or
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exploits that take advantage of software vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow,
format string, or others to corrupt control pointers in the monitored applica-
tion [43]. DIFT functions by tracking the propagation of values derived from
untrustworthy I/O channels and checking that these values do not become the
operands of of instructions that influence the control flow of the monitored ap-
plication. In our implementation of DIFT, the co-processor maintains a one-bit
metadata for each architectural register and word of addressed memory to in-
dicate the level of trustworthiness of the value stored in that location: the bit
has a value of 0-Trusted or 1-Untrusted. Privileged modules in the operating sys-
tem for networking will use new instructions added to the ISA for writing to
FlexCore metadata to set the metadata of each word of memory read in from
an untrustworthy network channel to 1. For each arithmetic and logic (ALU),
load (LD), or store (ST) instruction that is executed by the main processing core,
the co-processor will update the metadata of the destination operand according
to the metadata propagation rules that the hardware is configured to perform
for that instruction type. When security critical instructions are executed by the
monitored application, the co-processor checks that the metadata of each of its
source operands are not Untrusted.
Array Bounds Checking (BC) Array bounds checking (BC) is based on pre-
vious works that perform reference checking using coloring [3, 33]. In contrast
to approaches that store reference information using a centralized table of ob-
jects [117, 47, 96, 44] with their base and bounds information, BC is a simpler
approach that assigns just enough ”colors” or unique IDs to the allocated mem-
ory of an application so that out-of-bounds writes can be detected by a pointer
dereference writing to memory that does not match the pointer’s color. To im-
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plement BC, the co-processor maintains four-bits of metadata for each register
and eight-bits of metadata for each word of memory. The metadata in each reg-
ister and the four LSBs of the metadata for each memory word in the monitored
application are COLOR1; the four MSBs of metadata for each memory word of
the monitored application are COLOR2. Compiler instrumentation is needed to
insert FlexCore metadata write instructions to set the metadata of each pointer
and memory block returned by memory allocation operations such as malloc()
such that COLOR1 of the pointer is equal to COLOR2 of the allocated mem-
ory range. On each load instruction executed by the monitored application, the
co-processor will load COLOR1 of the accessed memory location to the desti-
nation metadata register. For instructions executed by the monitored applica-
tion that perform pointer arithmetic, the co-processor will update the metadata
of the destination operand according to custom metadata propagation rules
for pointer metadata [33]. Lastly, on all memory access operations (including
stores), the co-processor will also load COLOR2 of the accessed memory loca-
tion and confirm that COLOR1 of the register operands used to calculate the
memory address matches the loaded COLOR2.
Soft Error Checking (SEC) Soft error checking (SEC) is based on previous
works that detect transient errors, such as bit-flips, in the processor’s datap-
ath [10, 90]. In our implementation of SEC, the co-processor maintains no meta-
data but verifies the computation using a simpler logical operation using par-
tially decoded information about the instruction and its operands to check com-
puted result. To implement SEC, the interface between the main processing core
and the co-processor was expanded to including decoded information about
the instruction type, the value of the instruction’s operands, and the result of
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the computation. For each instruction communicated from the main processing
core, the co-processor computes an expected checksum for what is expected of
the result based on the instruction type and its operands and a result checksum
using the result communicated from the main processing core. At the final step
of each monitoring operation, the expected checksum is checked against the re-
sult checksum and an error is communicated back to the main processing core
if the checksums do not match.
Other Monitoring Approaches Besides the examples that were discussed in
the preceding paragraphs, we believe that the FlexCore co-processing model is
composed of building blocks that allow it to be used to implement a large class
of other hardware runtime monitoring approaches. For example, the wealth
of works in security and reliability that take the approach of explicitly assign-
ing metadata to memory locations and then using customized checks using
that metadata can all be easily mapped onto the FlexCore accelerator fabric.
These approaches can provide functionality such as fine-grained memory pro-
tection [149], information flow control [144, 126, 160, 161], memory debugging
support [166], and program checkpointing [155]. By communicating low-level
details about the computation being performed by the main processing core,
the co-processing model can perform event counting. The co-processing model
can also use the interface to offload functionality from the main processing core
and provide for features that facilitate garbage collection [76], computational
acceleration [65], and more.
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3.3 Architecture Overview
3.3.1 Scope and Design Goals
The following list summarizes our main goals in designing the high level archi-
tecture:
• Flexible: The FlexCore architecture should be flexible in having the capac-
ity to map a broad range of runtime monitoring functions. The architec-
ture should also be dynamically reconfigurable so as to allow new runtime
monitoring functions to be added in the field.
• Efficient: Runtime monitoring functions on the FlexCore framework
should be more efficient than software-only implementations, particularly
in terms of power and performance.
• Non-Intrusive: To minimize the implementation costs, the architecture
should only require minimal changes to the main processing core. Fur-
ther, the added programmability should not degrade the performance of
the main processing core.
Figure 3.2(a) shows the high-level block diagram of the FlexCore architec-
ture. The yellow (light) rectangles represent components in traditional micro-
processors and the blue (dark) rectangles represent new components for Flex-
Core. At a high-level, the architecture resembles the co-processing model that is
described in the previous section. The main processing core forwards each com-
pleted instruction from the monitored application to the co-processor for run-
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Figure 3.2: FlexCore architecture block diagrams.
Fabric interface. The architecture provides a separate cache subsystem for meta-
data with a separate cache hierarchy and metadata TLB for the co-processor. For
cost and efficiency, the co-processor shares an interface to main memory with
the main processing core.
The FlexCore architecture is carefully designed to exploit the common char-
acteristics of run-time monitoring techniques without restricting the monitor-
ing operations that can be performed. For example, unlike traditional FPGA
co-processors, the main processing core forwards its execution trace without
explicit intervention from software. The accelerator fabric is optimized for bit
operations, which makes them a good match for run-time monitoring, and the
meta-data cache hierarchy supports configurable read and write granularities
of sizes that are a power of two between 1 and 64bits.
While the fine-grained reconfigurable fabric is a good fit for typical meta-
data computations in run-time monitoring schemes, the bit-level reconfigurable
fabric is a poor match for coarse-grained structures such as memory arrays and
decoders. The FlexCore architecture handles inefficiencies in fine-grained re-
configurable fabric with a set of custom hardware optimizations.
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• Decoupled execution: The co-processor is decoupled from the main process-
ing core through the use of FIFO queues that enable non-blocking commu-
nication of instructions. In each cycle, the processing core places instruc-
tions that are guaranteed to commit into the FIFO. Unless the FIFO is full,
the processing core can make progress independent of the reconfigurable
fabric. This decoupling can hide the latencies of runtime monitoring oper-
ations for each instruction. Furthermore, it also allows the main process-
ing core to run on its own clock domain and at speed that is independent
of the reconfigurable fabric’s maximum speed for a particular logic imple-
mentation. The clock domains are also carefully organized so that TLB
and cache accesses by the both main processing core and the co-processor
do not require more cross-domain communication.
• Filtering and pre-processing: The core-fabric interface can mitigate effects
of the lower throughput of the reconfigurable fabric by only sending in-
structions that are relevant to the runtime monitoring function being per-
formed on the accelerator fabric and filtering out the rest. Further, we
also send partially decoded information about the instruction through the
core-fabric interface so as to avoid the need to perform decode operations
inefficiently on the reconfigurable fabric.
• Specialized hardware modules: The reconfigurable fabric incorporates a set
of dedicated hardware units for functions that are common across many
runtime monitoring functions and are expensive in terms of the perfor-
mance penalty when mapped to the accelerator fabric. These modules




Function Module Field Description Bits
Config CFGR FFIFO Select a FIFO behavior for each instruction type: 1) ignore, 2) accept only
if not full, 3) accept and proceed, 4) accept and wait for an acknowledge-
ment. Contains 2 bits for each of the main 32 instruction types (SPARC
prototype).
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CTRL PACK Acknowledgement for a trap signal from the co-processor. 1
PC Program counter. 32
INST Undecoded instruction. 32
ADDR Address for a load/store. 32
RES Result of an instruction. 32
SRCV1 Source operand 1 value. 32
Core SRCV2 Source operand 2 value. 32
To FFIFO COND Condition codes that affect instruction processing. 4
Fabric BRANCH Computed branch direction information. 1
OPCODE Decoded instruction opcode. 5
DECODE Miscellaneous decoded signals. 32
EXTRA Extra processor control signals. 32
SRC1 Decoded Source1 register number. 9
SRC2 Decoded Source2 register number. 9
DEST Decoded Destination register number. 9
Fabric CACK Acknowledgement for FFIFO. 1
To CTRL EMPTY A signal to indicate that there is no pending instruction in the co-processor. 1
Core TRAP Raise en exception. 1
BFIFO VAL A return value on a ’read from co-processor’ instruction. 32
Table 3.2: The FlexCore interface between the core and the fabric.
The reconfigurable fabric communicates with the main core through a set
of FIFO interfaces as shown in Figure 3.2(b). The FIFOs are connected to the
commit stage of the main core. Table 3.2 lists in more detail the signals on
the core-to-fabric interface. The core-to-fabric interface works to enable fine-
grained instruction communication between the core and reconfigurable fabric.
The processing core sends its execution trace to the co-processor using the FIFO
interface, so that the fabric can perform monitoring or bookkeeping operations
on each forwarded instruction.
A forward FIFO sends a trace of instructions, which are completed and ready
to commit, in the program order. Each FIFO entry contains comprehensive in-
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formation regarding the committed instruction, including a program counter,
source and destination operands, ALU results, condition codes, and the branch
outcome. In addition, we found that bit-level reconfigurable fabrics were a par-
ticularly poor fit for performing the decoding operations of a traditional pro-
cessing core. Bit-level reconfigurable fabrics based on 4-bit or 6-bit CLBs ex-
pended 70-80% area and delay on programmable routing [74], this makes them
a poor fit for performing complex decoding operations with very large fan-out.
Hence, each FIFO entry also includes pre-decoded instruction fields such as an
opcode, source register numbers, and a destination register number, in order
to avoid performing instruction decode on the accelerator fabric. For compar-
ison, we found that our DIFT prototype can run 30% faster by performing the
instruction decoding for operands and control signals on the processing core.
A forwarding configuration register (CFGR) specifies how the forward FIFO
handles each instruction type1. For example, the CFGR can be configured to for-
ward load/store instructions but not ALU or control instructions when imple-
menting UMC. The FIFO may also be configured to either allow an instruction
to commit as soon as it is enqueued or stall the commit until there is also an
acknowledgment from the co-processor that it is error free.
The reconfigurable fabric uses additional FIFOs to communicate back to the
main core. A back FIFO (BFIFO) returns values from the co-processor for oper-
ations such as a special “read from co-processor” instruction added to the main
processing core. In addition to data, the control module (CTRL) allows a set of
synchronization operations between main core and the co-processor. The co-
processor sends an acknowledgment back (CACK) for an instruction when the
1We augmented the decoding logic on the main processing core to drive an additional signal
indicating what type (of 32) of instruction each is in the SPARC ISA
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commit stage in the main core waits for a completion of an operation on the co-
processor. In addition, the fabric provides a signal (EMPTY) to indicate whether
there are any pending instructions in the co-processor. The reconfigurable fabric
can also raise an exception using the trap signal (TRAP). If the interrupt level of
the processor is sufficiently low, the main core acknowledges such an exception
(PACK) and invokes a proper handler.
Note that the proposed FIFO interface with the reconfigurable accelerator
fabric can easily support custom instructions on the main core for monitoring
function. For example, in order to implement an instruction to set a configura-
tion register within the reconfigurable fabric, the fabric can be programmed to
update the register on a an instruction that would otherwise be a NOP for the
main processing core.
3.3.3 Reconfigurable Fabric Architecture
The high-level FlexCore architecture is independent from the micro-architecture
of the reconfigurable fabric and is applicable to various types of fabrics. In our
evaluation of the FlexCore architecture, we used a standard LUT-based FPGA
architecture with island-style interconnect that is similar to the Xilinx Virtex-
5 [154], which includes standard Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) with LUTs
and flip-flops. We used Xilinx ISE 12.4 [153] for the Xilinx Virtex V to evaluate
the area, performance, and power consumption of our framework. The FPGA
fabric is chosen over other coarse-grained fabrics because the bit-level reconfig-
urable fabric appeared to be a good fit for typical runtime monitoring functions
that perform bit-level operations.
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Our reconfigurable fabric also includes an embedded meta-data register file,
which is implemented with custom hardware and has an 8-bit shadow register
for each general-purpose architecture register in the main core. The register file
provides an efficient way to keep meta-data for registers in a similar way that
SRAM banks in commercial FPGAs provide efficient memory blocks. Because
we already provide dedicated modules such as FIFO interfaces with decoded
instructions, a TLB, and a cache for common co-processing operations, our ac-
celerator fabric only includes standard Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) with
LUTs and flip-flops without specialized dedicated modules such as block RAMs
or DSP units.
3.3.4 Meta-Data Memory Hierarchy
For meta-data used by the reconfigurable fabric for bookkeeping, the reconfig-
urable fabric uses its own cache subsystem that is separate from the main core’s
L1 caches. This design minimizes interference with the main core’s cache struc-
tures. Both the processing core and the reconfigurable fabric share the lower-
level memory hierarchy such as an L2 cache and main memory. Currently, the
architecture does not maintain coherency between the main core’s L1 caches and
the meta-data L1 cache. For the runtime monitoring functions that we studied,
the co-processor only need to access meta-data in memory regions disjoint from
program instructions and data. Cache coherence mechanisms can be added for
future extensions that require fine-grained memory sharing between the main
core and the co-processor.
The meta-data cache is almost identical to regular data caches except for the
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capability to write at a bit granularity. Meta-data cache reads return the same 32-
bit words as the cache in the baseline processor. For writes, the meta-data cache
utilizes 32-bit write enable mask in addition to the address and the data word,
and only bits within the cache word where the bit mask is set are updated. We
found that the bit-level write capability is essential for efficient co-processing
since many co-processing techniques work on meta-data much smaller than a
word. Without this feature, a co-processor would need to perform two separate
cache operations, a cache read followed by a cache write, in order to properly
update the meta-data.
3.3.5 Programming Reconfigurable Fabric
The FlexCore architecture is designed for scenarios where the co-processor is
treated as a hardware extension that only changes infrequently. For example,
we envision that the reconfigurable fabric is programmed once and utilized un-
til a long-running program has completed. In this context, the programming
of the fabric does not need to be fast. Further, it makes sense from a cost and
density perspective to store programming configuration bits in SRAM since this
cost-effective approach dominates the market. Standard programming methods
in today’s commercial FPGAs, where a bitstream is serially shifted in to config-
uration memory, can be used to populate the configuration bits.
From a security and privacy perspective, because the reconfigurable fabric
can closely monitor virtually all computations of the main core, its configura-
tion memory must be protected from soft errors, and its programming must be
restricted to only trusted parties. For security and privacy, a processor vendor
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can choose from two options depending on how open the FlexCore feature is
desired to be. First, the FlexCore programming can be treated similar to today’s
microcode updates, where the vendor can tightly control what updates can be
performed. Only the vendor can create a valid update for the reconfigurable
fabric and the programming interface is invisible to the software layer. Alter-
natively, the FlexCore programming interface can be exposed to an operating
system, where only one process or processes with the highest privilege levels
are allowed to update the reconfigurable. In both cases, the operating system
must properly manage the meta-data memory space for monitoring functions
that make use of metadata and ensure memory isolation between the meta-data
of each process. Lastly, while we did not implement this, FlexCore could be
further protected by making use of previously proposed techniques [7] of using
CRC and error detecting codes to protect the configuration memory.
3.3.6 Precise Exception Support
To hide the latency of runtime monitoring operations, the FlexCore architecture
decouples monitoring operations from the main processing core using a Core-
Fabric FIFO queue and allowing the main processing core to push committed
instructions into the queue and continue without waiting for monitoring op-
erations for that instruction to complete. In this decoupled fashion, the main
processing core will only stall the commit of completed instructions when the
Core-Fabric queue is full, and this greatly improves the performance overheads
of runtime monitoring on the FlexCore architecture. However, the decoupling
also implies that the detection of an error in the co-processor may take place
many cycles after the error has already occurred and modified system state, we
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call this mode of error detection decoupled checking. In decoupled checking,
by the time that an error is detected, additional instructions will complete on
the main core, and more damage to the monitored application and state state
could take place.
Runtime monitoring functions typically perform two types of operations:
bookkeeping to update its metadata to reflect that of the monitored applica-
tion; and checking using application data and metadata to ensure that an error
did not occur. For bookkeeping operation performed by many runtime moni-
toring approaches, the bookkeeping can be performed in a decoupled fashion.
Similarly, for runtime monitoring functions where damage from errors can be
contained within the memory space of the monitored application and the ap-
plication exhibits fail-stop behavior, the bookkeeping and checking operations
can both be decoupled. However, for the remaining classes of applications and
runtime monitoring functions, where errors could result in damage that is dif-
ficult to undo or recover from, then a mechanism needs to exist to ensure that
critical instructions are checked before they are allowed to update system state,
we call this mode of error detection precise checking. In the remainder of this
subsection, we will discuss alternatives for implementing precise checking on
different types of processing cores.
For security critical instructions and system calls where the monitored ap-
plication may make irreversible changes to system system, these instructions
can be forwarded to the runtime monitoring function but be delayed from com-
mit until checks are complete. For modern out-of-order processors, such delays
simply mean that instructions stay in an ROB (Re-Order Buffer) longer with-
out necessarily stalling the execution of subsequent instructions. This simple
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and straightforward approach for precise checking will have negligible effects
on the performance of the monitored application when the frequency of critical
instructions and system calls are low. However, if the frequency is high, then
alternative mechanisms may be needed to mitigate the performance impact of
such checks. We will discuss options for precise checking for out-of-order and
in-order processing cores in the subsequent paragraphs.
For high-performance processing cores that make use of a ROB to reorder
instructions and enable speculation, these architectures buffer instructions in
its reorder buffer until the instructions are guaranteed to complete and are no
longer speculative. For such architectures, we can simply extend the speculation
support to cover instructions that have yet to be checked by the co-processor.
Hence, instructions executed by the monitored application can complete and















Figure 3.3: Block diagram of processing core with precise exception sup-
port.
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For in-order processing cores that eschew speculation for area and energy
efficiency, additional cost-effective hardware mechanisms are needed to allow
for precise checking. Figure 3.3 shows the block diagram of one possible way
that precise checking can be implemented on such architectures. The main idea
behind the mechanism proposed in the figure is to ”buffer” completed instruc-
tion results so that the monitored application can continue to make forward
progress and to allow each ”buffered” instruction to modify architectural state
only when it does not result in an error. Intuitively, the approach can miti-
gate the overheads of checking when monitored applications exhibit bursty in-
struction execution patterns: the burst of commits can be ”buffered” and then
checked, and the buffers can drain when the pipeline is idle and waiting for
long latency operations, such as memory loads, to return. Rather than make
extensive modifications to the in-order processing core, we leave the majority
of the core unchanged. All instruction executed on the main processing core are
allowed to update the register file in the main core pipeline immediately upon
commit so that following instruction can use the results. However, memory
writes are buffered in case a check fails and a copy of architectural state is pre-
served that can be restored on a detected error. To this end, we extend the archi-
tecture with several ”buffers” for completed instructions and their register and
memory updates. The Unchecked Memory List (UML) buffers and bypasses
speculative memory updates (stores) and each UML entry holds the value and
the address of unchecked memory write. All loads on the main processing core
are extended to check the UML for a matching entry before reading from the
memory hierarchy. A Back-up Register File (BRF), which has the same number
of entries as the main (speculative) register file, is added and is only written to
by instructions that have been checked. The Unchecked Instruction List (UIL) is
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a FIFO that holds a list of speculative instructions that are completed in the main
core but not checked by the co-processor. The main core enqueues instructions
into the UIL after completing an instruction and forwarding the instruction to
the co-processor. Each entry in the UIL holds a pointer to an UML entry, desti-
nation register, and register write result.
As the co-processor completes the checking of each instruction, if the check
passes, the next UIL entry is dequeued and its register and/or memory write are
allowed to proceed to the BRF and/or memory. However, if the check fails, then
the main core can restores its state to the before the failing instruction using the
additional ”buffers”. The register file can be restored by copying values from
the BRF. Next, the core flushes all entries in the UIL and UML and the pipeline,
sets the appropriate status registers to indicate that a failed check occurred, and
a control transfer instruction to the base address of the exception handler can be
inserted into the processor pipeline.
3.4 Prototype Implementations
To evaluate the FlexCore architecture, we built a prototype system based on the
Leon3 [56] as the main processing core. Leon3 is a synthesizable VHDL model of
a 32-bit processor compliant with the SPARC V8 architecture [128]. The Leon3
architecture provides a single-issue in-order pipeline with seven stages. The
core-fabric FIFO interfaces are added to the exception stage, which is the next
to last pipeline stage. The prototype does not include a L2 cache, which is not
implemented on the Leon3. As this thesis focuses just on the effectiveness of
the high-level FlexCore architecture, the current prototype does not support the
52
meta-data TLB for multi-programming.
The rest of the section describes the implementations of the four runtime
monitoring functions that we presented in Section 3.2. The monitoring functions
range from simple (UMC) to more sophisticated (DIFT) and area-intensive (BC)
and they are moderately pipelined (between 3 to 6 stages) to improve through-
put.































































































































Figure 3.4: Block diagrams for FlexCore extension prototypes. Dark blocks
represent the FPGA fabric.
Figure 3.4(a) shows the high-level block diagram of the example UMC run-
time monitoring function implemented on FlexCore’s accelerator fabric. UMC
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uses a 1-bit meta-data for each memory word to check if it has been initialized
before use [64, 146]. Software explicitly clears the corresponding meta-data on
memory de-allocation. The meta-data is updated on a store instruction and
checked on a load instruction. For UMC, the core-to-fabric interface is config-
ured to forward only load or store instructions committed by the monitored ap-
plication to the co-processor. For each FIFO entry received by the co-processor,
UMC makes use of the opcode and the memory address accessed by the for-
warded instruction. If the opcode indicates a store instruction, the meta-data
at the memory destination is updated to 1. If the opcode indicates a load in-
struction, the meta-data loaded from the metadata cache for the corresponding
memory location and is checked. If the meta-data is not set on a load instruc-
tion, the check fails, and a trap is delivered to the main processing core through
the control interface.
3.4.2 Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT)
Figure 3.4(b) shows the high-level block diagram of the example DIFT runtime
monitoring function implemented on FlexCore’s accelerator fabric. This proto-
type for information flow tracking maintains a 1-bit metadata per word of mem-
ory and register, which is sufficient to detect control pointer attacks [131, 41]2.
Software can explicitly set or clear metadata, such as when a system call is per-
formed to read input from an untrusted I/O channel. DIFT makes use of the
register file on the accelerator fabric to store meta-data for each register on the
main processing core. DIFT can also be configured with control registers to spec-
2DIFT implementations may use multiple bits per tag [43], or have a tag per each byte in
memory [26] for greater detection capabilities. However, the basic operations are almost identi-
cal and this discussion applies to those variants in the same way
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ify custom metadata propagating and checking policies. For DIFT, the core-to-
fabric interface is configured to forward loads, stores, ALU instructions, indirect
jumps, and other custom instructions from the monitored application to the co-
processor. For each FIFO entry received by the co-processor, DIFT makes use of
the opcode, register operand indexes if the instruction read from or stored to the
register file, and the memory addresses if the instruction read from or stored to
memory. For unary ALU, load, and store instructions, the meta-data is copied
from the source metadata register or memory location to the destination meta-
data register of memory location. For ALU instructions with multiple source
operands, the metadata of the sources are OR’d to determine the destination
meta-data value. On security critical instructions such as indirect jumps, the co-
processor checks the metadata of the register operand used in the instruction,
and if the metadata is set, an exception is delivered to the main processing core
through the control interface.
3.4.3 Array Bound Check (BC)
Figure 3.4(c) shows the high-level block diagram of the example BC runtime
monitoring function implemented on FlexCore’s accelerator fabric. The heap
bounds-checking technique is an adaption of a previously proposed approach
that colors pointers and their intended referent objects and detects buffer over-
flows when a pointer and its dereferenced location do not match in color [33].
BC is implemented in the FlexCore co-processing model in a way similar to
UMC and DIFT. In fact, BC can be seen as a combination of UMC and DIFT fea-
tures. For meta-data, BC makes use of the register file on the accelerator fabric
to maintain an 4-bit metadata (pointer color) for each register; for each word in
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memory, the co-processor maintains a 8-bit metadata (4-bit pointer color and a
4-bit object color). Software can explicit set the metadata of the created pointer
and allocated memory objects on a memory allocation such as malloc() for the
heap. For BC, the core-to-fabric interface is configured to forward loads, stores,
arithmetic instructions (for pointers), and other custom instructions. For each
ALU, load, or store instruction received by the co-processor, BC propagates the
metadata by either copying the metadata (load/store) or adding or subtracting
the metadata of the two source operands (ALU). For load and store instructions,
BC loads a 8-bit (two 4-bit) metadata value from memory. The upper 4-bits are
propagated to the metadata register file, and the lower 4-bits are checked against
the metadata of the register used to compute the memory address. On a load or
store instruction, if the meta-data of the register operand does not match the 4-
bit (object color) meta-data loaded from memory, a trap is delivered to the main
processing core through the control interface.
3.4.4 Soft Error Check (SEC)
Figure 3.4(d) shows the high-level block diagram of the example SEC runtime
monitoring function implemented on FlexCore’s accelerator fabric. SEC veri-
fies computation results from the main core’s ALU to detect soft hardware er-
rors such as single event upsets. While verifying other aspects of the execution
such as instruction decoding will require more logic, we believe that the ALU
checker represents the general characteristics of soft error checks where verifi-
cation of each instruction is independent. For SEC, the core-to-fabric FIFO is
configured to forward all ALU instructions along with their opcodes, source
operand values, and results from the monitored application. For each instruc-
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tion received by the co-processor, the opcode, the source values, and the result
values are used to compute a checksum to verify that the result was computed
correctly. The checker verifies each bit individually for additions, subtractions,
and logic operations. For multiplication and division, modular arithmetic (mod
M), where M is a Mersenne number of 3, is performed to verify that the result
was correctly computed [90]. If the result was not verified to be correct, a trap
is delivered to the main processing core through the control interface.
3.5 Evaluation
This section evaluates the proposed FlexCore architecture using silicon area,
power, and performance as metrics. To study the overheads of the reconfig-
urability, FlexCore is compared to ASIC implementations of each monitor. We
do not evaluate the functional effectiveness of each monitor, such as the attack
detection capability of DIFT, as that has already been evaluated extensively in
previous research [148, 165].
3.5.1 Evaluation Methodology:
To estimate the area, power consumption, and operating frequency of the hard-
ware modules for a typical ASIC flow, we used Synopsys Design Compiler
(DC) [135] with a 65nm IBM technology design kit. The FIFOs and the SRAM
blocks for caches were created by a memory compiler included in the design kit.
To estimate the same metrics for monitors implemented on the FPGA fabric, we
used Synplify Pro [134] and Xilinx ISE [153]. The tools were used to map each
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monitoring function to the Virtex-5 FPGA, which was also manufactured in a
65nm technology, so as to match the technology node that we used in the ASIC
flow. Each monitoring function on the FPGA was fully placed and routed, with-
out dedicated components such as the core-fabric interfaces and caches. This
synthesis provided the estimates for the operating frequency and the number of
LUTs. To compute a rough estimate of the area, we used an estimate of CLB tile
area from the model by Kuon and Rose [82]. The model reports that the area of
a CLB tile with 10 6-input LUTs in the 65nm technology node is approximately
8,069µm2. We used this estimate of 807µm2 per LUT and multiplied it by the total
number of LUTs used in our design to generate an area estimate. To compute an
estimate of the power of the reconfigurable fabric, we used the Virtex-5 Power
Spreadsheet [152] using the frequency and number of LUTs from FPGA synthe-
sis. The area and power consumption of the shadow register file are obtained
from a memory compiler and included in the estimates for the dedicated Flex-
Core modules. The power estimates currently use a fixed toggle rate of 0.1 and
static probability of 0.5 for both ASIC and FPGA to provide rough comparisons.
To evaluate the impact of each monitor on monitored application perfor-
mance, we performed RTL simulations of the entire system, including the
processing core, caches, FlexCore monitor, memory controller, and off-chip
SDRAM. The default configuration includes a Leon3 core with a single-issue
7-stage pipeline, 32-KB L1 instruction and data caches with 32-B lines, a 4-KB
meta-data cache with 32-B lines, and a 64-entry core-to-fabric FIFO. The Leon3
caches use a write-through and no-allocate policy. The simulations ran a set of
benchmarks from MiBench [60] and other custom kernels that evaluate compu-
tational throughout.
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3.5.2 Area, Power, and Frequency
Monitor Description
Max Freq Area Power
(MHz) µm2 overhead mW overhead
Baseline - Unmodified Leon3 - 32KB L1 465 835,525 - 365 -
ASIC
UMC Leon3 with UMC 463 932,118 11.6% 388 6.3%
DIFT Leon3 with DIFT 456 960,558 15% 388 6.3%
BC Leon3 with BC 456 996,894 19.3% 393 7.7%
SEC Leon3 with SEC 463 836,786 0.15% 364 -
FlexCore
Common Leon3 with FlexCore 458 1,106,967 32.5% 418 14.6%
UMC UMC on Flex fabric (FPGA) 266 90,384 10.8% 21 5.8%
DIFT DIFT on Flex fabric (FPGA) 256 123,471 14.8% 23 6.3%
BC BC on Flex fabric (FPGA) 229 203,364 24.3% 27 7.4%
SEC SEC on Flex fabric (FPGA) 213 390,588 46.7% 36 9.9%
Table 3.3: The area, power, and frequency of the FlexCore architecture.
The overheads in silicon area and power consumption are
shown relative to the baseline Leon3.
Table 3.3 summarizes the estimated area, power consumption, and operat-
ing frequency for the Leon3 processor with and without various monitors. We
found that the unmodified Leon3 with 32-KB L1 caches can run up to 465MHz
and consume about 0.836mm2 and 364.2mW. These numbers are comparable to
those of the ARM processors such as ARM926EJ-S [9]. The full ASIC results,
where the Leon3 processor with each monitor is synthesized using the ASIC
flow, show that UMC, DIFT, and BC consume 12 to 20% additional silicon area
and 6 to 8% additional power. These overheads are dominated by the meta-data
cache and FIFOs for the core interface. For SEC, the overheads are negligible be-
cause SEC does not require a meta-data cache or a complex interface. The Leon3
processor with an FlexCore modification in full ASIC implementations results in
a slightly lower operating frequency because of the probes on internal pipeline
signals.
For the FlexCore implementations, the table separately shows the estimates
for each monitor on the Flex fabric and the estimates for the dedicated (ASIC)
59
modules common for all FlexCore implementations including the FlexCore in-
terface and 4-KB meta-data cache. Similar to the ASIC implementations, the
synthesis results show that the addition of the FlexCore interface that taps into
the main core pipeline slows down the frequency slightly by 1.5%. The ded-
icated FlexCore modules (the interface and the meta-data cache) add about
32.5% more silicon area and 14.6% more dynamic power compared to the base-
line Leon3 processor. These overheads are higher than the ASIC implementa-
tions because the FlexCore interface is more general. In the FlexCore imple-
mentations, the Flex fabric adds noticeable overheads in addition to the meta-
data cache and the interface. The monitors require the Flex fabric to be 0.09 to
0.39mm2, which represent 11 to 47% additional area overheads, and consume 6
to 10% additional power.
While the relative area overheads are noticeable for the Leon3 processor,
which is a tiny embedded processor, the results demonstrate that the FlexCore
architecture is far more energy-efficient than running a monitoring function on
another processing core. Also, we note that the absolute area and the power con-
sumption for the FlexCore modules are quite small if compared to higher-end
microprocessors. For example, each processing core in UltraSPARC T2 occupies
12mm2 in the 65nm technology. MIPS R14000, which is fabricated in the 0.13µ
technology, occupies 204mm2 and consumes 17W at 500MHz. For these modern
processors, the relative overheads of FlexCore will be insignificant.
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Benchmark UMC DIFT BC SEC
(1X) (0.5X) (0.25X) (1X) (0.5X) (0.25X) (1X) (0.5X) (0.25X) (1X) (0.5X) (0.25X)
sha 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.06 1.16 1.03 1.07 1.15 1.00 1.33 1.50
gmac 1.01 1.01 1.09 1.01 1.15 1.34 1.02 1.17 1.37 1.00 1.20 1.47
stringsearch 1.03 1.05 1.12 1.16 1.46 1.89 1.22 1.45 1.84 1.00 1.00 1.11
fft 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.31 1.02 1.03 1.35 1.00 1.15 1.45
basicmath 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.08 1.34 1.04 1.07 1.37 1.00 1.14 1.43
bitcount 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.36 1.69 1.13 1.27 1.64 1.00 1.19 1.48
geomean 1.02 1.02 1.05 1.05 1.18 1.43 1.07 1.17 1.44 1.00 1.16 1.40
Table 3.4: The performance overhead comparisons between ASICs and
FlexCore. The performance is shown as the execution time that
is normalized to the execution time of the baseline Leon3 proces-
sor without modifications. The table includes execution times
when each monitoring approach is running at the same fre-
quency as the main core (1X), half of the frequency of the main













































e 8 16 32 64 128 256
1x clock 1/2x clock
Figure 3.5: The percentage of instructions forwarded to the reconfigurable
fabric for each FlexCore monitor prototype.
3.5.3 Performance
The performance overheads of the FlexCore implementations are estimated by
running RTL simulations with two separate clocks for the main core and the Flex
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fabric. The clock frequency for the Flex fabric is set based on the frequency esti-
mates from the synthesis results. BC, UMC, and DIFT run at half the frequency
as the main core (0.5X in the table) while SEC runs slower (0.25X). Table 3.4
presents the normalized execution time for each monitor. The execution times
are normalized to the baseline Leon3 without any monitoring. The ASIC im-
plementations with the same clock frequency for both monitor and core show
at most 7% performance overheads. For UMC, the performance of FlexCore is
virtually identical to the ASIC performance despite running at half of the core
frequency because only a small portion of instructions are forwarded to the re-
configurable fabric to be processed as shown in Figure 3.5. BC and DIFT have
a slightly higher performance overheads of 18% for FlexCore because the fabric
needs to process a larger percentage of main core instructions and access the
memory for meta-data. SEC has the highest performance overheads at 40% be-
cause it processes a large number of instructions while running at a low clock
frequency.
The experimental results demonstrate that monitoring on FlexCore is far
more efficient than software implementations with comparable capability. For
DIFT, previous software implementations have placed the performance over-
head as high as 37 times [102]. Even a highly optimized implementation on
high-end superscalar processors reported an average slowdown of 3.6 times
[113]. For UMC, Purify [64] performs similar checks by adding state bits to
each byte in memory, and was reported to slow down monitored programs by
a factor of 3. The array bound check in software can also incur a noticeable
slowdown in memory intensive programs up to 1.69 times even with extensive
optimizations [47]. We also note that these software implementations are tested
on high-performance processors where software overheads can be hidden by
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the superscalar processing and dynamic scheduling. We expect the software
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Figure 3.6: Average FlexCore performance for varying forward FIFO sizes.
Since the processor must stall when a forward FIFO between the core and
fabric is full, the FIFO must be sized appropriately to accommodate the slow-
downs on the reconfigurable fabric for meta-data accesses. For this purpose,
we studied the impact of the FIFO size on the performance for our monitors as
shown in Figure 3.6. A 64-entry forward FIFO was found to be sufficient for our
implementation. FIFO sizes smaller than 64 entries caused noticeably greater
performance overheads while larger forward FIFO sizes offered marginal per-
formance benefits. The silicon area for the FIFO only increase by about 10%




The simulation results show that the co-processing for security and reliability
monitoring is indeed feasible on FlexCore for embedded processing cores run-
ning at hundreds of MHz (<500). From the results of the evaluation, we ob-
served that the two main sources of overhead on the monitored application in
FlexCore are the throughput mismatches between the main processing core and
accelerator fabric, and contention for shared memory bandwidth. The former
is apparent in how the performance overheads of each monitor increases when
the operating frequency of the accelerator fabric decreases. The latter can be
demonstrated by the larger performance overhead of BC, which makes use of
larger 8-bit metadata, in comparison with UMC, which makes use of 1-bit meta-
data. These overheads remain a barrier for the proposed approach’s applicabil-
ity to higher performance processing cores that run at several GHz (or more).
3.6 Demo Prototype
The evaluation results of the preceding chapters were gathered from a simula-
tion of the RTL prototype. To flesh out the details of the design and provide
for a live demo, we mapped the prototype to a stand-alone FPGA. To meet this
goal, we hashed out implementation details such as the fabric-memory inter-
face, exception handling, and extending the ISA with custom instructions. The
rest of this section will briefly discuss the prototype’s key components, which
were implemented in collaboration with Luke Ackerman.





Figure 6 - AMBA Bus Master-Slave Operation [4] 
The AMBA bus operates in a multiple Master-multiple Slave configuration, whereby a 
centralized arbiter schedules transfers between master-slave pairs. In Figure 6, the arbiter (blue) 
grants control of the bus to Master #1 (red), who then proceeds to drive the bus with the 
corresponding address, data and control information. All slaves attached to the bus receive an 
identical copy of the information and attempt to fill the request. Similar to the arbiter, a 
centralized decoder (yellow) determines which slave is intended to be accessed based on the 
address information and only allows that data to drive the corresponding bus to the masters. In 
this case, Slave #3 (green) is allowed to push data out to each of the masters, which is ignored by 
all but the currently granted master (Master #1). A key point is that each of these transfers is 
pipelined to increase overall access performance. Figure 7 illustrates this point: 
 
Figure 7 - AMBA Transfer Timing Diagram 
Figure 3.7: AHB usage example: The red lines show how Master #1 is
granted control of the bus by the arbiter and broadcasts its re-
quest to all AHB slaves. In the example, AHB slave #3 holds
the requested data, and the green lines show how it responds
to the request and how its data is steered back to Master #1.
processing core that served as the a master on the AMBA High-Performance
Bus (AHB) and a range of peripherals, such as memory and PHY controllers,
that served as slaves. AHB usage protocols allow a central arbiter to coordinate
behavior between AMBA masters and slaves. At a high level, the protocols
allow any master to make requests; the arbiter will grant control to one master
at a time, the granted master can then broadcast its request to all slaves; when
the data becomes av ilable, a decoder wi l select only the data returned by the
designated slave to return to the requesting master. Figure 3.8 shows how the
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arbiter and the decoder would handle an example request for data made by
an AHB master. To complete an implementation of the prototype, which has
a co-processor that can independently access and cache metadata from main
memory, required the addition of one more AHB master that conformed to AHB
usage protocols and timing.
21 
 
stage needed to be, indirectly, modified in order to allow data corresponding to the CPOP 
instruction, which is res lved in the exception stage, to update the regist r file.  
 In order to allow for a range of instruction sub-types for interacting with the FLEX 
monitor, CPOP instructions are further decoded by the specific regist rs used. The table below 
shows the current decoding for both CPOP1 and CPOP2: 
Opcode rs1 rs2 rd Function 
CPOP1 X X 0 Disable Monitor 
CPOP1 X X !(0) Enable Monitor 
CPOP2 A B 0 MEM[A] = B 
CPOP2 A B 31 MEM[A] = INIT (B) 
CPOP2 A X 1-30 RD = TAG[A] 
Figure 12 - CPOP Decoding 
As can be seen above, CPOP1 instructions are used as a way to enable and disable monitoring. 
This feature is to be used when the software (Operating System) intends to do tag propagation 
manually. By disabling the monitor and then performing sets and reads of tag information, you 
can ensure that tag data is not affected by these instructions. Additionally, it may be desired to 
only run the monitor on some programs but not others. Therefore, as is seen in Figure 12, the 
CPOP1 instructions are further decoded into enable and disable instructions depending on the 
selected destination register. Similarly, the CPOP2 instructions are allocated for setting and 
reading tag data from the monitor. If the destination is the zero register, than it is assumed to be a 
set instruction, as no data can be stored into the zero register. The tag for the address stored in 
rs1 is set to the value stored in rs2. On the other hand, if the destination register is something 
other than the zero register, then it is filled with the tag value for the address in rs1. The 
exception to this rule is if the destination register is r31 (which is traditionally used for the 
function return address). In this case, using r31 means that the address stored in rs1 should be 
initialized to the value in rs2, overwriting any previous tag data in the block. This will be further 
Figure 3.8: Example usage of special CPOP instructions for monitoring
control and metadata initialization
To allow the system to manage runtime monitors implemented on FlexCore,
software interfaces must be exposed to allow the system to bootstrap metadata
values when the monitored application launches, disable monitoring when the
monitored application is interrupted, and to specify custom behavior when the
monitored pplication akes syst m call . To impl ment an exampl of this
functionality, we utilized two xisting and unimplement d opcod e codings
in the SPARC instruction set, CPOP1 and CPOP2. At a high level, most of these
instructions have minimal effect on the pipeline (an exception is CPOP2 when
RD is specified). These newly implemented instructions are forwarded to the
co-processing fabric, which recognizes them as metadata access requests from
the main processing core. Figure 3.8 shows an example implementation of these
special instructions for a runtime monitor that performs taint tracking. In this
example, CPOP1 is used to enable or disable the monitor based on its RD field,
and CPOP2 is used to read or write metadata values.
When errors are detected in the runtime monitor and sent back to the main
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core, a mechanism must be available on the main core to catch the error signal
and determine the next step to take after the error has occurred. To implement
this mechanism, we extended the trap tables in the SPARC architecture with
an additional trap type that is specific to errors that are signaled by runtime
monitors. With this functionality, custom software handlers can be registered
for invocation on errors reported by the runtime monitor implemented on the
co-processor.
After these modifications were implemented, we were able to physically
demonstrate the ability of the prototype, which was running on a Xilinx ML509
FPGA, to detect buffer overflow and memory overwrite errors and call the ap-
propriate software handler. Additional details about the steps taken to imple-
ment the hardware modifications, timing diagrams, and source code for demo
programs are available in Luke Ackerman’s project report [2].
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the design and implementation of FlexCore, a hy-
brid architecture that combines a custom-built microprocessor with an on-chip
reconfigurable fabric for mapping hardware reliability and security functions.
FlexCore can serve as a general platform for hardware run-time monitoring fea-
tures, and these features can be added for testing and/or full-time use long
after the platform has been fabricated and shipped. Case studies and proto-
types of four example monitoring features on FlexCore show that it can support
a broad spectrum of monitoring functions ranging from very simple to more
in-depth computational checking. Our performance evaluation with a suite of
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monitoring approaches showed that the overheads of FlexCore on monitored
application performance correlates with the difference in throughput between
the general purpose processing core and the reconfigurable fabric. For simpler
hardware runtime monitoring approaches such as information flow and unini-
tialized memory checking, the difference in throughput is small and FlexCore
was shown to be able to have low performance overheads on the monitored ap-
plication. However, for runtime monitoring approaches that require complex




HARDWARE ACCELERATOR FOR HIGH-PERFORMANCE RUN-TIME
MONITORING
This chapter proposes an optimized on-chip accelerator architecture for run-
time monitoring named Harmoni (Hardware Accelerator for Runtime MONI-
toring). Unlike FlexCore, which utilizes a bit-level reconfigurable fabric to map
any runtime monitoring approach that can be implemented using lookup tables,
Harmoni is more purpose-built as a datapath for metadata processing. The nar-
rowed focus of Harmoni allows the accelerator to be used as a co-processor for
high-performance processors running at clock frequencies of a few GHz.
The FlexCore architecture presented in Chapter 3 was shown to be a promis-
ing approach for security and reliability. In augmenting a general purpose pro-
cessing core with a bit-level reconfigurable fabric, we reasoned that many run-
time monitoring functions perform fine-grained, bit-level operations that can
map efficiently to such fabrics. An evaluation of a prototype of FlexCore with
several example runtime monitoring functions showed that it was capable of
providing functionality to embedded processing cores (< 500MHz). However,
despite optimizations to mask the inefficiencies of the reconfigurable fabric,
monitoring functions mapped to the FlexCore architecture were unable to at-
tain operating frequencies much higher than 250MHz. The low operating fre-
quencies of the on-chip bit-level reconfigurable fabric limit its applicability to
embedded applications.
From a high-level perspective, there appears to be a fundamental trade-
off between efficiency and programmability for runtime monitoring as illus-
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Figure 4.1: Trade-off between efficiency and programmability.
ers, switches, routing, and so on) so as to allow for choices; but the additional
hardware (for example as on a programmable gate array) results in lower oper-
ating speeds compared to equivalent ASIC designs for implementing complex
logic. However, the performance gap between island-style bit-level reconfig-
urable fabrics and ASICs is large, and there appears to be an opportunity to
bridge the gap by trading off some flexibility and choice for performance.
To this end, we propose to carefully restrict the programmability of the accel-
erator fabric so as to better match the characteristics of common runtime moni-
toring operations. In particular, we found that many instruction-grained moni-
toring techniques are built upon the notion of tagging, which binds metadata to
program state. Using these bindings, runtime monitoring can track and check
the state of the computation by updating and checking the metadata based on
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the events that occur on relevant program state in the monitored application.
While the notion of tagging has been studied before [58, 129, 53, 161], this work
presents a more general architecture that can support a broad range of run-time
monitoring techniques that are built on tagging.
Harmoni maintains programmability by broadly supporting monitoring
schemes that use tagging of various sizes and at different granularities. Har-
moni also supports operations on metadata that range from regular ALU com-
putations to irregular updates and checks by using a combination of custom
circuits and programmable look-up tables. By focusing specifically on support-
ing monitoring schemes that make use of tagging, Harmoni can achieve a high
operating clock frequency of 1.25GHz on a 65nm standard cell technology. This
higher clock frequency allows Harmoni to keep pace with high-performance
processors that are running at clock frequencies of a few GHz and maintain low
performance overheads. An evaluation of the Harmoni prototype also shows
that the architecture is far more energy-efficient compared to using multiple
processing cores for both running the application and performing monitoring
operations. Harmoni has moderate area overheads for a small embedded pro-
cessing core, but is quite small compared to modern processing cores that run
at higher frequencies.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the
model for the parallel monitoring with tagging, and shows how example mon-
itors can map to the model. Section 4.2 presents the tagging architecture. Sec-
tion 4.3 studies the performance, area, and power consumption of our architec-
ture. Section 4.4 concludes.
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Figure 4.2: Parallel run-time monitoring with tags.
Figure 4.2 shows a high-level model of computation used by instruction-
grained monitoring techniques. In the figure, the light blocks on the left rep-
resent the computation performed by the monitored application and the dark
blocks on the right represent the monitoring function. Conceptually, the moni-
toring function observes each instruction that is relevant to the monitoring be-
ing performed in order to track one or more properties of the monitored ap-
plication. To track these properties, runtime monitoring approaches can ”tag”
or bind individual units of the state of the monitored application to metadata
that discretely enumerates the range of the property being tracked. In order
to maintain consistency between application data and metadata, runtime mon-
itors must perform bookkeeping operations to access its metadata and to com-
pute new metadata values to reflect the completion of the observed instruction.
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In addition to this bookkeeping, runtime monitors must also be able to invoke
computation that uses a combination of metadata values and predefined con-
stants to check that any pre-determined invariants of the properties of the mon-
itored application are always being met.
In this section, we will survey several previously proposed monitoring
schemes for security and reliability for their bookkeeping requirements and the
operations they perform. While not comprehensive of all approaches that have
been proposed in prior work, it does cover a spectrum of functionality. From
this spectrum we can gather an understanding of the abstract primitives that a
generalized accelerator can be built upon.
4.1.2 Monitoring Examples
Dynamic Information flow tracking (DIFT) [131]: As introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4.2, DIFT is a security monitoring approach that attempts to prevent soft-
ware exploits from taking over a vulnerable program by tainting data derived
from untrusted I/O channels and tracking their use. To taint untrustworthy
data, DIFT binds the value contained within each byte of memory and regis-
ter with a bit of metadata for each policy that it attempts to use for tracking
and checking. In order to track the propagation of taint within the monitored
application, various types of policies have been proposed in previous work for
computing the metadata of destination operands [131, 29, 34, 43] on arithmetic,
logical, move, and branch instructions. On move and arithmetic and logical
instructions, the destination operand typically becomes tainted if any of the
source operands are tainted. However, this policy alone can be insufficient as
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branch instructions can contribute to indirect types of data-flow [29, 34] and
false positives are possible when tainted data has been sanity checked or are
cleverly cleared using ISA features [131]. Past works have been able to find so-
lutions for false positives by using heuristic knowledge to customize the taint
propagation policies and selectively clear the metadata of operands that may
have been sanity checked. Lastly, for checking the use of tainted values on sen-
sitive control transfer instructions such as indirect jumps and function calls, the
metadata of the source operands are used in logical comparison operations.
Uninitialized memory checking (UMC) [146]: As introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4.1, UMC is monitoring approach based on HeapMon [125], which was
proposed as a way to detect programming mistakes where a program variable
is not initialized before use [52]. To track whether memory has been initialized
since allocation, UMC binds each relevant memory location (of a byte in size) in
the monitored application with a bit of metadata to indicate whether the loca-
tion has been initialized. To compute metadata updates for UMC, the runtime
monitor simply sets the metadata of the destination memory bytes on move in-
structions. On reads of dynamically allocated memory locations, the metadata
of the accessed memory bytes are used in logical comparison operations to en-
sure that they have been initialized.
Array bounds checking (BC) [33]: As introduced in Section 3.4.3, BC is
an adaption of a previously proposed approach that utilizes a low number of
reusable metadata values (instead of a unique metadata value) for each area
of memory allocated to detect illegal memory accesses [33]. BC binds a 4-bit
metadata to each memory location that encodes the color of the memory loca-
tion; and a 4-bit metadata to the value contained within each word of memory
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and each register that encodes the color of the pointer value contained within
the register or memory word. BC relies on the memory allocator to assign the
same value (color) to both the metadata of an allocated memory region and the
pointer that was initialized using the return value of the allocation function. To
accurately track the color of the pointer value resulting from all possible opera-
tions on a pointer, BC relies on a complex propagation policy based on the oper-
ation performed and the colors of its operands. On memory move instructions,
the pointer color is trivially moved from the source to the destination operand.
However, on arithmetic and logical instructions, the pointer color of the desti-
nation operand is determined by a custom propagation policy. The policy uses
heuristics of how pointers and pointer offsets are typically generated to either
copy the pointer color or clear the destination pointer color. On all memory ac-
cess instructions, the pointer color of the address and the memory color of the
accessed memory location are used in a logical comparison operation to check
that they are equal.
Reference counting (RC) [76]: RC transparently performs reference count-
ing in hardware to aid garbage collection mechanisms implemented in software.
By transparently maintaining reference counts, RC allows software memory al-
location mechanisms to quickly find freed memory blocks and expedite the col-
lection process. RC binds a 32-bit metadata to memory locations that mark the
start of allocated memory regions in the memory space of the monitored appli-
cation. The metadata encodes an integer representing the reference count of the
allocated memory region. RC relies on compiler modifications to explicitly in-
dicate instructions that create or overwrite pointer references. On an instruction
that creates a new pointer, the pointer value is used to lookup and increment the
reference count of the allocation memory region. On an instruction that over-
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write an existing pointer, the pointer value is used to look up and decrement the
reference count.
Monitor Trigger Action
DIFT (1-bit value tag)
ALU instructions Tag(reg dest) := Tag(reg src1) or Tag(reg src2)
LOAD instructions Tag(reg dest) := Tag(mem addr)
STORE instructions Tag(mem addr) := Tag(reg dest)
JUMP instructions check reg src1 != “1”
UMC (1-bit location tag)
LOAD instructions check Tag(mem addr) != ”0”
STORE instructions Tag(mem addr) := “1”
BC (4-bit location tag and 4-bit value tag)
LOAD instructions
check Tag(mem addr) == Tag(reg src1)
Tag(reg src1) := Tag(mem addr)
STORE instructions
check Tag(mem addr) == Tag(reg src1)
Tag(mem addr) := Tag(mem src1)
ADD instructions Tag(reg dest) := Tag(reg src1) + Tag(reg src2)
SUB instructions Tag(reg dest) := Tag(reg src1) - Tag(reg src2)
OR instructions Tag(reg dest) := 0
XOR instructions Tag(reg dest) := 0
NOT instructions Tag(reg dest) := -Tag(reg src1)
RC (32-bit object tag)
Create pointer refcnt[addr] := refcnt[addr]+1
Destroy pointer refcnt[addr] := refcnt[addr]-1
Table 4.1: Tag types and operations for example set of run-time monitoring
functions.
Table 4.1 summarizes the characteristics of each monitoring technique in
terms of the metadata bindings and the computation that they perform using
the metadata. From the survey of runtime monitoring approaches, it can be ob-
served that a monitoring approach can be differentiated by its tag type and tag
operations. The tag type defines the metadata and metadata bindings that are
maintained by the monitor. The set of tag operations define which events in
the monitored application trigger compute operations in the monitor and how
metadata are updated and/or checked on such events.
4.1.3 Tag (Meta-data) Types
To track properties of the monitored application, runtime monitoring ap-
proaches can bind each unit of the state of the monitored application to meta-
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data that discretely enumerates the range of the property being tracked. In par-
ticular, monitoring techniques can maintain metadata for three types of appli-
cation state: data value, memory location, and high-level program objects.
Value tag: Many monitoring techniques tag each data or pointer value in
a program with metadata. For example, while DIFT tags each byte of mem-
ory with a 1-bit metadata to indicate whether it is from a potentially malicious
I/O channel, fat-pointer-based array bounds checking approaches can tag each
pointer word with 4 or more bits of metadata to pair it with its intended refer-
ent. For both these approaches, they can be viewed as maintaining value tags for
individual units of register and memory state in the monitored application, as
the value tag follows the value as it is used or copied.
Location tag: A monitoring approach may also tag a location such as a mem-
ory address with metadata instead of tagging the value. Such a location tag is of-
ten used to maintain information on the properties of the storage location. For
example, a memory protection technique can bind permission bits to individ-
ual memory locations and use these permission bits to check if an access can be
allowed regardless of the value contained within the location. Monitoring func-
tions that check for memory usage errors may also use a location tag to check if
each memory location is initialized before a read. Similar to the value tags, the
location tags are generally bound at a granularity consistent with the smallest
unit of data accessed and used by the monitored application.
Object tag: For efficiency reasons, program monitoring schemes may choose
to not bind metadata to all data of the monitored application, but instead at a
coarse-grained granularity for only high-level programming constructs such as
classes, structures, arrays, and so on. As an example from the survey, a refer-
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ence counter for garbage collection can be maintained for program objects, and
metadata representing the counter value can be bound to the address of its first
element. While it is possible to implement such coarse-grained tags using fine-
grained per-byte or per-word tags–essentially, make all tags that correspond
to a large object to be the same value–managing and updating the object tag
separately reduces the memory space overheads of metadata and reduces the
complexity of managing metadata consistency.
4.1.4 Tag Operations
In general, tag operations, which refer to computation that is invoked to update
or check metadata values, are triggered by computation performed by the mon-
itored application that use or update the values and/or locations within the
monitored application. Information about the values or locations used in a pro-
gram can be deduced from the operands of the instruction that executes in the
monitored application. For example, ALU instructions indicate that bookkeep-
ing operations need to be invoked to update the metadata of the destination
value or location that the computed result was written to. The invoked book-
keeping operations can use the metadata bound to each of the instruction’s
operands to determine the updated metadata value. Alternately, load/store
instructions indicate that a particular memory location is being accessed and
can trigger metadata operations that can check the legality of the access using
the metadata bound to the memory address and the metadata of the operands
used to calculate the memory address. Hence, for each instruction executed by
the monitored application that is relevant to the monitoring function being per-
formed, the tagging operations typically consists of a subset of the the following
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common sequence of operations.
• Read: The monitor reads metadata that corresponds to the value or loca-
tion used by the monitored application: register or memory for value tags,
memory for location tags, and a separate data structure for object tags.
• Update: The monitor updates metadata based on the event that occurred
in monitored application.
• Check: The monitor may check the metadata for an invariant and assert a
signal if the invariant is violated.
• Write-back: The monitor writes back the updated metadata. The value
tag is typically written to the metadata that corresponds to the result of
the monitored application’s instruction. The location tag is often written
to the location that is accessed by the monitored application.
4.2 Architecture Design
4.2.1 Overview
In this section, we present the design of Harmoni, which is designed as a accel-
erator for efficiently implementing runtime monitoring techniques based on the
notion of tagging. As shown in Figure 3.2, Harmoni is designed to be used as a
replacement for the bit-level reconfigurable fabric used in the FlexCore architec-
ture proposed in Chapter 3. The architecture allows the monitoring on Harmoni
to be decoupled from the program running on the main processing core using





















Bus to an L2 cache or a memory controller 
Figure 4.3: High-level block diagram of the Harmoni architecture.
the interface, the main processing core can communicate completed instructions
that are relevant to the monitoring being performed in a non-blocking fashion.
As long as the FIFO within the Core-Fabric interface is not full (and checking
operations events that require synchronization), the monitored application and
monitoring on Harmoni can operate independently. In our implementation of
the Harmoni prototype, the FIFO is sufficiently sized (64 entries) to accommo-
date short-term differences in the throughput between the main processing core
and Harmoni.
4.2.2 Programmability
Figure 4.4 show the block diagram with major components in the Harmoni
pipeline. At a high level, the Harmoni is built upon primitive components with
knobs for customizing the behavior of each component. These knobs can be





































































Tag Read Tag Compute Tag Update
Figure 4.4: High level block diagram of the Harmoni pipeline. The
pipeline can be broken down into five discrete stages. The first
two stages read the tags of operands used in the instruction,
the third and fourth stage update and check the tags, the fifth
stage writes the updated tag. The output of the control table
is connected to all of the modules in the last four stages of the
pipeline and determines their behavior.
gram monitoring operations with different tag types and tag operations.
To efficient support three types of tags: value, location, and object tags, Har-
moni allows both the metadata size and tagging granularity to be dynamically
reconfigured. The memory and data paths are provisioned for metadata sizes
that are a power of two and up to a word (32 bits) in size, check and update com-
putation can be explicitly configured to take only the lower bits that are relevant
to the monitoring being performed. The metadata memory translation mecha-
nism can make use of configuration registers on Harmoni to adjust the gran-
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ularity of the metadata bindings. For example, for monitoring approaches that
bind one byte of metadata to each double-word (64-bits) of the monitored appli-
cation, the metadata memory translation mechanism would locate the metadata
memory address using a base address for metadata and adding a calculated off-
set and load one byte from the metadata memory hierarchy at that address. The
offset calculation can make use of the configuration register, which allows meta-
data to be bound to monitored application data from one to eight bytes (power
of two), in its calculation and emits the appropriate metadata address. Expand-
ing the size of this register allows still even more coarser-grained bindings to be
made for all data in the monitored application.
Separate from value and location tags, object tags require the binding of in-
dividual metadata values to a memory range of an arbitrary but bounded size.
To implement this functionality, Harmoni stores metadata bound to high-level
program objects in object tables (OBJTBL) that are explicitly controlled by the
privileged processes that aid the monitoring being performed. Previous stud-
ies [96, 161, 137] have shown that arrays and data structures in modern appli-
cations have high temporal locality and only a handful of entries in a cache for
metadata for these structures are sufficient to minimize the need for software
intervention to refill the tables. In the Harmoni implementation, we cache 32-
entries in the OBJTBL. Each entry of the OBJTBL stores metadata bound to a
tuple that represent the base and bound memory address of a cached high-level
object and the metadata for a particular address within an object is looked up
in two steps. In the first step, the table compares the base and bound addresses
of each entry in the OBJTBL with the address to determine if the a tuple exists
in the table where the base address is lower than the address and the bounds
address is greater than the address. If at least one entry matches, then the index
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of the entry corresponding to the tuple is determined using a priority encoder,
and this index is used to access the tag table (TTBL), which holds the metadata
values, for the corresponding metadata. On access to the OBJTBL that miss,
Harmoni can be configured to either ignore the miss or to raise an exception to
indicate to the main processing core that a software handler must be invoked to
refill the table.
To support value tags, Harmoni shadows the value stored in each register
in the main processing core using a tag register file (TRF) and the value in each
memory location using a metadata cache hierarchy (TMEM). The TRF binds
metadata to values stored within the corresponding register in the main pro-
cessing core and is indexed with the same decoded register numbers used by
instructions forwarded from the monitored application. Similarly, TMEM is ac-
cessed using the same virtual address calculated by the main processing core on
load/store instructions, but the virtual address is mapped to metadata memory
addresses using the metadata memory translation mechanism 1 and these map-
pings can be cached in the tag TLB. To minimize contention for cache storage
with data from the monitored application and the possibility of polluting cache
data, TMEM is also built as a hierarchy of conventional caches and shares only
the bus interface to shared main memory with the main processing core’s cache
hierarchy.
To efficiently support various modes of operation of computation for up-
dating and checking metadata, Harmoni includes hardware provisions for per-
forming two distinct compute operations in a sequence for each instruction for-
warded by the main processing core. 2 As an example, on an instruction for-
1The metadata memory translation mechanism is built on the same principles as paging in
the main processing core’s memory hierarchy.
2As an alternative for implementing the same functionality, the runtime monitoring frame-
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warded from the monitored application, Harmoni can compute the updated
metadata for the destination operand and then use the updated operand value
to check an invariant of the monitored application.
For compute operations that update metadata values, Harmoni uses either
the update ALU (UALU) or a software-configurable update table (UTBL). The
UALU is built from an optimized arithmetic unit [69] to handle most 32-bit inte-
ger computations using two metadata operands. The UTBL is built as a lookup
table for implementing custom computation using the same input operands
as the UALU. Similar to the update, the tag check operation can also be per-
formed using one of two compute blocks, the check ALU (CALU) or a check
table (CTBL). The CALU supports typical arithmetic operations and the CTBL
can be looked up similarly to the UTBL. In our prototype, both UTBL and CTBL
are implemented as caches with 32 entries. The check operations also take up
to two input metadata values, one of which can come directly from the output
of the compute block used to calculate the updated metadata value, but include
logic to reduce the output to a single binary signal that can be used to indicate
to the main processing core whether the check succeeded or failed. This signal
is used to deliver an exception over a backward FIFO to the main processing
core, which invokes an appropriate exception handler to check for false posi-
tives and/or handle the error.
To support the co-existence of value and location tags, Harmoni must also
support monitoring functions that read and write TMEM for the same instruc-
tion. For example, on memory writes in BC, the legitimacy of the write access
work can be configured to determine the necessary monitoring operations within the clock do-
main of the main processing core and then forward multiple operations in sequence to Harmoni
for the same functionality. However, this alternative can exacerbate the difference in through-
put between the main processing core and the monitoring being performed and undermine one
of the primary goals of the approach.
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must be verified before allowing the write to complete. After the write com-
pletes, the metadata of the corresponding address must also be updated. Har-
moni provisions for this scenario by allowing TMEM to be read and then used
in computation for checking and updating the metadata value. The final com-
puted metadata value is then written to TMEM in another pipeline stage. To get
around the structural hazard this functionality represents, we used a multi-port
implementation of the first level caches in Harmoni, but this may be unnec-
essary if separate cache read and cache write queues are used in the TMEM
implementation.
To tie together the operations of the pipeline, Harmoni uses a statically-
programmed look-up table for pipeline control signals (CONTBL). The CON-
TBL is indexed by the opcode of the forwarded instruction and its output de-
termines the control signals in each pipeline stage of Harmoni (Our prototype
separated the SPARC ISA into 32 instruction types). The control signals from
the CONTBL are propagated each pipeline stage to enable or disable operations
to read the metadata value, update and/or check the metadata, and whether
to stored the computed metadata value. As an example, for an instruction
forwarded by the main processing core that will update the metadata of the
corresponding destination operand, the CONTBL signals specify whether the
computation will be handled by the UALU or the UTBL and what compute op-
eration will be performed.
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4.2.3 Tag Processing Pipeline
Having described the Harmoni architecture at a high-level, we now describe
individual pipeline stages of the Harmoni architecture, which is also shown
in Figure 4.4. The Harmoni pipeline can be broken down into five high-level
stages. The first two stages read the relevant metadata for the monitored in-
struction, the third stage computes the updated metadata, the fourth stage per-
forms a metadata check, and the fifth stage writes the updated metadata value
back to the tag register file, the tag memory, or the object tag table. In contrast
to typical processor pipelines that begin with fetch and decode stages, Harmoni
obviates the need for much of these stages by following the control flow of the
monitored application.
In the first stage of the pipeline, the instruction is “decoded”. The CONTBL
is accessed using the opcode of the forwarded instruction. The tag register file
indexes to read tags from are selected using signals from the control table. At
the same time, the stage looks up the OBJTBL by checking the base and bound
addresses with the pointer address from the main processing core.
In the second stage of the pipeline, metadata values are accessed from the
tag register file (TRF), the tag memory (TMEM), and the object table (OBJTBL).
Up to two metadata values are read from the TRF, one contiguous chunk of
metadata values are read from TMEM, and one object metadata value is read
from the OBJTBL.
In the third stage of the pipeline, the computation to update the metadata
value is performed. Up to two metadata values are used by either the UALU
or the UTBL to calculate the updated metadata value. The output of either the
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UALU or the UTBL is selected using control signals from the CONTBL and
propagated to the next stage of the Harmoni pipeline.
In the fourth stage of the pipeline, the metadata value is checked. The CALU
takes the updated metadata value along with another metadata value from the
TRF, the TMEM, or the OBJTBL, and performs a unary or binary comparison
to determine the check result. The CTBL uses the same input tags to perform
a more customized checking operation. The output of either the CALU or the
CTBL is selected using control signals from the CONTBL to drive exceptional
signals back to the main processing core.
In the fifth and final stage of the pipeline, the updated metadata value is
written back to the tag register, the tag memory, and/or the object tag table. The
updated metadata is sent on a broadcast bus to these three structures, and the
writing of this metadata for each module is controlled by a set of control signals
generated from the CONTBL.
4.2.4 Monitor Examples
Figure 4.5 shows how the run-time monitoring techniques that we discussed in
Section 4.1 can be mapped to Harmoni. The figure highlights the modules that
are used by each monitoring scheme in block diagrams.
The modules that are used by uninitialized memory checking (UMC) are
shown in Figure 4.5(b). In UMC, the location tag of the memory that is accessed
is read and checked on a load, and the location tag of the accessed memory

































































































































(d) RC - hardware support for reference count-
ing
Figure 4.5: Run-time monitoring techniques mapped to the Harmoni co-
processor.
the tag of the accessed memory location from the TMEM. This tag is propagated
through the UALU unchanged, and checked in the CALU to confirm that the
accessed memory location was initialized (the tag is set). For store instructions,
the control table sets the UALU to output a constant ”1”, which is stored to the
TMEM at the address from the store.
The modules used by dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) are shown
in Figure 4.5(a). In DIFT, ALU instructions propagate metadata between regis-
ters, memory instructions propagate metadata between registers and memory,
and metadata is checked on certain sensitive control transfer instructions. For
ALU instructions, the CONTBL selects decoded register file indexes sent from
the monitored application and metadata values read from the TRF are sent to
the UALU. The UALU is programmed to compute the updated metadata based
on the metadata of the inputs and the instruction opcode by performing an OR
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operation, and the result is written back to the TRF. For load instructions, the
CONTBL enables reading of metadata from the TMEM and sending the meta-
data from memory to the UALU. The UALU passes through the metadata un-
altered and this result is written to the TRF using the destination register index
for the load. For store instructions, the CONTBL enables reading of the meta-
data from the TRF. This metadata is propagated through the UALU and into the
TMEM. For indirect jump instructions, the metadata of the jump target address
is read from the TRF, propagated through the UALU, and checked in the CALU.
The modules used by array bounds checking (BC) are shown in Figure 4.5(c).
In bounds checking, explicit instructions set and clear a value tag (pointer tag)
and location tags (corresponding locations) on memory allocation and deal-
location events, the pointer tags are propagated on an ALU instruction and a
load/store operation, and then the pointer and location tags are compared on
each memory access instruction to ensure in-bound accesses. In our prototype,
we implemented the scheme using 4-bit metadata values, which represent 16
colors. However, the necessity of needing to support value and location tags
from BC meant that 8-bit metadata values need to be maintained for each word
of memory where the 4 MSB represent the location tag and 4 LSB represent
the value tag. For ALU instructions, the value tags (pointer colors) of source
operands are read from the TRF and propagated to the UALU. The UALU cal-
culates the tag for the result, and this tag is written to the TRF for destination
register. For memory load instructions, the CONTBL enables both the TRF and
the TMEM in the second state to read both the value tag of the load address
(TRF) and the value and location tags of the accessed memory location (TMEM).
Then, the pointer tag of the memory address is compared with the memory lo-
cation tag from the TMEM in the CALU to ensure that they match. The tag of
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the loaded memory value is then written back to the TRF. For memory store
instructions, the pointer tag of the accessed address is read from the TRF and
compared with the memory location tag from the TMEM as in the load case.
The tag of the value that is being stored is then stored to the TMEM. To sup-
port customized metadata propagation policies that are necessary to avoid false
positives [33], the UTBL can selectively leveraged to support the exceptional
cases.
The modules used by hardware reference counting (RC) are shown in Fig-
ure 4.5(d). In the reference counting, specialized instructions that create or over-
write a pointer explicitly send the pointer value that was created or overwritten
to the monitor running on Harmoni. The pointer is compared to a stored list
of object base and bound addresses in the OBJTBL to determine the reference
count (metadata) that needs to be updated. If the pointer does not lie within the
base and bound addresses of any objects in the OBJTBL, an exception is raised so
that software on the main processing core can update the OBJTBL. For instruc-
tions that create a pointer, the object that the created pointer points to is looked
up and the reference count for that object is incremented in the UALU. This
updated reference count is written back to the OBJTBL. For instructions that
overwrite a pointer, the object that the overwritten pointer points to is looked
up, the reference count for that object is decremented in the UALU, and this up-
dated reference count is written back to the OBJTBL. The reference counts can
be utilized by the garbage collection approach running on the main processing
core in two ways: the collector can send custom instructions to the monitor to
query is a particularly object can be collected; or an exception can be delivered
to the main processing core when the reference count for an object has been





Instruction cache 32 KB, 4-way set-associative
Data cache 32 KB, 4-way set-associative
Cache block Size 32 B
Cache write policy write-through
Register file 144 registers, 8 windows
Harmoni Pipeline




Core-Harmoni FIFO 64 entries
Tag cache 4KB, direct-mapped
Tag cache block size 32B
Tag cache write policy write-back
Table 4.2: Architecture parameters.
Description Max Freq (MHz)
Area Power
µm2 overhead mW overhead
Unmodified Leon3 - 32KB IL1/DL1 465 835,525 - 365 -
Harmoni: Pipeline 465 248,818 29.9% 49 13.4%
1250 268,995 32.2% 124 34%
Harmoni: FIFO, cache, etc. 458 271,442 32.5% 53 14.6%
Table 4.3: The area, power, and frequency of the Harmoni architecture with different maximum tag sizes. The
overheads in silicon area and power consumption are shown relative to the baseline Leon3 processor.
To further evaluate the Harmoni architecture, we implemented a prototype
system based on the Leon3 microprocessor [56]. Leon3 is a synthesizable RTL
model of a 32-bit processor compliant with the SPARC instruction set [128]. The
main processing core in Leon3 is composed of an in-order, single-issue seven
stage instruction pipeline with 32KB of on-chip L1 instruction and data caches.
In the prototype system, completed instructions are forwarded from the excep-
tion stage of the Leon3 processing core to the runtime monitor on Harmoni.
Because the opcode in the SPARC ISA can come from different parts of the en-
coded instruction and are irregular in size, we extended the decode logic of the
Leon3 processor pipeline to drive a five-bit signal that categorizes instructions
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in the SPARC ISA into 32 custom categories. This five-bit signal is used along
with a configuration register to ensure that only dynamic instructions from cat-
egories that are relevant to the monitoring function being performed are for-
warded from the Leon3 processor to Harmoni. To evaluate the area, power, and
maximum frequency of this architecture, we synthesized Leon3, Harmoni, and
corresponding hardware support structures in Synopsys Design Compiler us-
ing IBM/Virage 65nm standard cell libraries. Table 4.2 summarizes the param-
eters that we used in the evaluation. The power estimates are collected from
using a fixed toggle rate of 0.1 and static probability of 0.5 to provide rough
comparisons. Table 4.3 shows the results of this analysis.
Even without extensive optimizations, the Harmoni pipeline can run a max-
imum frequency of 1.25 GHz, which is more than 2.5 times the maximum fre-
quency of the Leon3 processing core for the same synthesis options and stan-
dard cell library. This result shows that Harmoni can keep pace with processing
cores that have much higher operating frequencies and instruction throughput.
Support structure for the Harmoni architecture, including the FIFO interface
from the main core and a tag memory system, was synthesized with the Leon3
processing core and had a minimal impact on the core’s clock frequency.
Part of the tradeoff for higher throughput is that the Harmoni architecture
has noticeable area and power overheads in relation to the baseline Leon3 pro-
cessor. The total area that includes the core-fabric FIFO, the tag cache, and Har-
moni makes up an additional 55% in area compared to the baseline Leon3 pro-
cessor 3. The area overhead can be mitigated by further trading off some flexi-
bility and limiting the maximum size of the tags that Harmoni can support. By
going to 16-bit and 8-bit pipelines for tag updates and tag checks, the respective
3Although the Leon3 is a small and simple embedded processing core
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area overheads of Harmoni can be reduced to 44% and 39%. The performance
of the Harmoni architecture allows it to be easily coupled with much larger and
state of the art processing cores that typically run at a few GHz. For example, the
Intel Atom processing core [35] is more than 25 times larger than Leon3 while
running at just 2X the maximum frequency of Harmoni. The full 32-bit Harmoni
pipeline would present an area overhead of less than 3% for Atom. Moreover,
we note that the Harmoni architecture is far more energy efficient compared to
an approach that utilizes a regular processing core as a monitor. At 465MHz,
Harmoni is estimated to consume 46mW, which is less than 15% of the baseline
processor power consumption. This is more efficient than consuming twice the
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Figure 4.6: The performance overheads of run-time monitoring on the
Harmoni co-processor. The Y-axis shows normalized perfor-
mance relative to an unmodified Leon3 processor. The X-axis
shows the names of benchmarks used in the evaluation.
To evaluate the performance overheads of the Harmoni architecture, we per-
formed RTL simulations of the architecture with three different monitoring tech-
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niques. Benchmarks used in the RTL simulations include programs from the
MiBench [60] benchmark suite as well as two kernel benchmarks for SHA-256
and GMAC, which are popular cryptographic standards. We compared the ex-
ecution time of these benchmarks between an unmodified Leon3 processor and
the Harmoni architecture, Leon3 with hardware monitors mapped to Harmoni,
and Leon3 with a hardware monitor mapped to the FPGA fabric as in Flex-
Core 3.
Figure 4.6 shows the normalized execution time of benchmarks on Harmoni
with respect to an unmodified Leon3 processing core. We implemented three
monitoring techniques on Harmoni, including uninitialized memory checking
(UMC), dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT), and array bounds checking
(BC). The results show that run-time monitoring on Harmoni has low perfor-
mance overheads on the monitored program. In fact, the Harmoni performance
is virtually identical to that of custom hardware monitors because most over-
heads come from tag accesses to memory, which are necessary for both imple-
mentations.
Because the Harmoni architecture is capable of running at a high clock fre-
quency (as shown in Table 4.3), it is more capable of keeping pace with faster
processing cores compared to FlexCore. Figure 4.7 shows the normalized per-
formance of Harmoni on a main processing core with a high clock frequency
(1GHz) and compares the result with the FlexCore approach with an on-chip
FPGA fabric, which can only run at roughly one-fourth of the main core’s clock
frequency. Due to its low clock frequency, FlexCore monitoring introduces sig-
nificant performance overheads. Because Harmoni can match the main process-
ing core’s clock frequency, its performance impact is fairly low. For the major-
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ity of benchmarks that we ran in the evaluation, the performance overheads of
Harmoni were much lower than FlexCore with a slow on-chip FPGA. While not
shown here, we found that Harmoni can keep pace even with a main process-
ing core running at 2.5GHz, which is twice its maximum frequency, with low
overheads. The higher frequencies achievable by Harmoni allows it to be used
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Figure 4.7: Normalized performance overheads of run-time monitoring on
the Harmoni co-processor and the FPGA-based co-processor
(FlexCore) for a main processing core running at 1GHz.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter presented the Harmoni architecture, which attempts to improve
upon the performance limitations of the FlexCore architecture by pairing the
main processing core with an improved co-processing fabric that is purpose-
built to implement monitoring techniques based on the notion of tagging. By
fixing the organization of the processing pipeline to support just monitor-
ing techniques based on tagging, Harmoni is able to dramatically improve its
throughput. However, Harmoni is able to retain flexibility through the use of
configurable components, and we showed how a variety of runtime monitoring
techniques can be mapped to the Harmoni fabric for checking memory bugs, se-
curity attacks, and performing bookkeeping such as the management of system
resources. At a high level, Harmoni presents a new design point on the spec-
trum between performance and flexibility for runtime monitoring approaches;
by matching the common characteristics of monitoring approaches based on
tagging, Harmoni can achieve very high performance without restricting the
capabilities of the monitoring approaches.
We evaluated the overheads of the Harmoni co-processor by building an
RTL model and evaluated the application performance with Harmoni monitor-
ing using RTL simulations. Harmoni was shown to be able to run at frequencies
of 1.25GHz when synthesized with Virage/IBM 65nm standard cell libraries.
This improvement on performance and reduction in overheads comes at a trade-
off of noticeable area and power consumption in relation to the baseline Leon3
processing core. However, Harmoni can keep pace with high performance pro-
cessing cores that are larger and more power hungry, and the overhead will
not be as significant in those applications. The RTL performance simulation
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results demonstrated for such high-performance cores that the higher operat-
ing frequencies of the Harmoni co-processor allows monitoring functions im-
plemented on the co-processor to have low overheads on the performance of
the monitored application. Further, the Harmoni performance overheads can
be mostly attributed to overheads of memory accesses for metadata, which re-




This chapter presents hardware optimizations to improve the performance
of runtime monitoring that support large tags. In earlier chapters, we discussed
how runtime monitoring can be effective as a general approach for security and
reliability. By operating at an instruction granularity, monitoring approaches
can observe detailed events in the monitored application regarding the com-
putation, accessed memory, and flow of control. From these events, runtime
monitors can check for behavior that deviates from predefined program invari-
ants such as unallocated memory accesses [64], out-of-bounds pointer derefer-
ences [44], and control data corruption [102].
In the the preceding chapters, we described how the adoption of a co-
processing fabric that uses reconfigurable hardware can simultaneously address
the conflicting requirements of performance and flexibility for runtime moni-
toring. The reconfigurable fabric provides flexibility to adapt to new threats;
performance optimizations such as filtering and decoupled processing allows
its performance overheads of the co-processing architecture to almost match
that of using custom hardware. However, runtime monitors must also main-
tain bookkeeping information (metadata) to track properties of the data for the
monitored application. For each event in the monitored application that touches
data, runtime monitoring approaches must utilize the associated metadata to
update bookkeeping or check for correct behavior. Aspects of the metadata,
including the mapping granularity and the metadata size, must also be config-
urable for flexibility. While large metadata provides important functionality, it
can also increase the performance overheads of runtime monitoring.
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To motivate the need for large metadata, we refer to the 0-1-∞ rule of soft-
ware design [89], which states that an entity–the metadata–should either be
forbidden, allowed to exist as an exception, or support an unlimited number
of instances. On the one hand, mechanisms that use a single bit of metadata
have been shown to be able to detect software errors such as spatial memory er-
rors [101] or control-hijacking security attacks [131]. However, the limited meta-
data size also constrained the functionality of these mechanisms. For example, it
was shown that no one policy can detect all attacks for information flow tracking
mechanisms [78], and depending on the comprehensiveness of data and control
flow tracking, too much data can be marked untrusted and generate false posi-
tives [131, 34]. Raksha [43] showed how more bits of metadata can address these
drawbacks: the additional bits can be used to implement multiple policies that
are tracked and enforced in parallel. These parallel policies can reduce both
the false positives and false negatives of information flow tracking [104]. In-
creasing the number of bits further, DataSafe [31] showed how using individual
bits to describe whether the associated data can be read, edited, sent in plain-
text, and so on, can allow a system with up to ten bits of metadata to provide
end-to-end self-protecting data solutions. As another example, undefined value
checkers [64, 122] showed how using two bits of metadata for memory safety to
track initialization and allocation status allows the overall mechanism to detect
spatial and temporary memory safety errors such as double free and dangling
pointers. In general, using more bits of metadata can allow runtime monitoring
approaches to have more functionality and better error coverage.
Beyond a couple of bits, other types of monitoring approaches have been
proposed that inherently rely on support for larger values of metadata. Pro-
gramming languages with runtime type checking such as LISP have tradition-
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ally relied on the use of metadata to encode the dynamic type of each variable
in the application [92, 136]. In particular, the LISP machine [92] used meta-
data in the range of 2-8 bits to encode the type of a corresponding memory
word in the application. To retrofit type checking to C applications, a number
of works have also proposed using metadata to find and detect memory errors
such as those caused by illegal pointer arithmetic errors [98, 75]. For example,
Hobbes [22] proposed to detect errors such as buffer overflows by encoding the
variable type, which is determined using static analysis and runtime type in-
ference, with a larger number of bits of metadata and checking the type of all
operands used in arithmetic operations. However, type checking alone can pro-
vide false positives that can be avoided by instead performing the checks when
pointers are dereferenced [117, 95, 151]. To accomplish these checks, capability
models can use fat pointers [11, 44, 71, 95] that use metadata of a double-word
in size to encode the base and bounds addresses of a pointer’s intended referent.
Despite the need to support large metadata for flexibility, there is a limit on
how many bits can be managed by hardware. For example, to track each byte of
memory value that was derived from untrusted input sources, TaintCheck [102]
allocates bookkeeping information in the form of a data structure containing
the system call number, a snapshot of the stack, and a copy of the data that
was written. This large amount of extra state gives metadata the expressive-
ness to allow TaintCheck to not only detect but also facilitate recovery from a
detected error [140]. As another example, Information flow security (IFS) mech-
anisms [144, 161] are able to provide stronger guarantees of data confidential-
ity than discretionary policies [149] by categorizing all entities using privilege
levels [18] and using those categories to block data movement. However, in
the context of systems such as Facebook, with its billions of users and each of
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whom would like to restrict the access of profile items to a circle of friends, the
data structures representing all of the possible categories can become very large
and difficult to manage. To manage the metadata used in these examples, IFS
implementations [144, 161] and TaintCheck [102] adopted tracking mechanisms
that encode metadata as pointers to data structures that hold the more detailed
bookkeeping information. This optimization reduces the storage overheads of
metadata by bounding their size to a word or double-word per byte [102] or
word [161] of memory. However, this comes at the cost that monitoring oper-
ations must invoke software handlers, which can only be circumvented using
hardware caching [161, 145, 46].
However, of greater concern is that the flexibility gained from supporting
large metadata will exacerbate the performance overheads of runtime monitor-
ing. The primary sources of performance overhead for the co-processing archi-
tecture for runtime monitoring presented in Chapter 4 were the long latency of
metadata memory accesses and contention for main memory bandwidth with
the main processing core, both of which will increase with larger metadata. In
this work, we evaluated optimizations on the metadata memory hierarchy of
a Harmoni-based system for runtime monitoring to mitigate the overheads of
metadata management. To look for optimization opportunities, we analyzed
the characteristics of metadata for several runtime monitoring approaches that
use large tags and found two distinct characteristics of metadata: sparsity and
frequent value locality. To take advantage of these characteristics, we propose
two hardware optimizations for the metadata cache hierarchy. In particular,
we designed and evaluated a filtering mechanism named Non-Default Meta-
data Cache (NDM) and Non-Default Metadata Cache with Eager Read (NDME)
that can take advantage of sparsity to filter metadata access and reduce meta-
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data memory traffic. Further, we also designed and evaluated a value-based
cache compression mechanism named Dynamic Metadata Compression (DMC)
that can take advantage of value locality to compress on-chip cache data.. In
our evaluation, we found that a combination of the proposed designs–NDME
and DMC–are able to reduce the memory bandwidth requirements of runtime
monitoring approaches and improve the performance overheads on monitored
applications from 86-267% to 3-117%.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.1 we
present our observations on the locality characteristics of metadata. In Sec-
tion 5.2 we present the organization of our cache architecture for efficiently
managing metadata in cache and memory. In Section 5.3 we present an eval-
uation of the overall system in terms of metadata cache miss rates and memory
bandwidth requirements. In Section 5.4 we summarize.
5.1 Locality Study
5.1.1 Baseline Design
Figure 5.1 shows the high-level organization of the hardware runtime monitor-
ing framework, which is organized similarly to the Harmoni architecture pro-
posed in Chapter 4, that was used as the baseline in this chapter. In the frame-
work, instructions committed by the processing core running a monitored ap-
plication are forwarded to the runtime monitor using a small FIFO in the Core-
Fabric interface. The runtime monitor is control-coupled to the monitored ap-
plication and performs operations for each instruction received from the queue.
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Figure 5.1: Block diagram of the baseline hardware organization for run-
time monitoring.
runtime monitor will use a metadata cache hierarchy to access the metadata
of the operands used in the instruction. Using a one-to-one mapping between
monitored application data and metadata, the runtime monitor can look up the
physical memory address of metadata for its operands using a tag TLB. For
low latency of access, the tag TLB caches the outcomes of invocations of meta-
data memory translation mechanisms [100]. The physical address of metadata
is then used to access a private tag cache hierarchy that is backed up by shared
main memory. The overall organization of decoupled processing and private
tag cache hierarchy allows the runtime monitor’s operations to be largely de-
coupled from the main processing core and to mitigate its impact on the behav-
ior of the monitored application.
For efficiency, co-processor in the Harmoni architecture is implemented as
an in-order single-issue monitoring pipeline, which research [55] has shown to
have sufficient throughput as typical monitoring loads rarely exceeds one in-
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struction per-cycle. However, the in-order processing pipeline also means that
the effects of misses in the first level cache are more readily exposed as over-
heads on performance. When misses occur–especially long-latency misses–the
instruction queue between the main processing core and Harmoni can fill up
and cause the main processing core to stall. In addition, because memory band-
width is shared with the main processing core for metadata accesses, the moni-
tored application’s performance will be affected by increases in memory band-
width usage for metadata.
To scale the design to processing cores that are capable of scaling to larger
applications with larger working sets, it is necessary to augment the design with
a secondary cache, which can be scaled up in size without affecting the delay of
the first-level cache. While a simple solution may be to increase the size of the
L2 cache to match the locality of data, such an approach would introduce high
area and power overheads, particularly when metadata is larger in size than the
corresponding data. Hence, more efficient management schemes are needed to
manage metadata caches. In the remainder of this section, we will analyze the
metadata of several runtime monitoring approaches to look for characteristics
that can facilitate optimizations for their storage.
5.1.2 Runtime Monitors
In this section, we will introduce the example runtime-monitoring approaches
that were evaluated in this work. Each of the approaches utilize larger double-
word metadata values and manages them in a transparent fashion. To facilitate
the description of each of the example runtime monitoring approaches, we will
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attempt to distinguish them by the following terminology:
Metadata Encoding: the semantic meaning of the metadata for the checks that
are being performed. All metadata are zero initially unless explicitly set by
privileged software handlers.
Metadata Propagation: for a given instruction and the metadata of the in-
struction’s input operands, how the metadata of the instruction’s destination
operands are updated.
Metadata Checks: for a given instruction and the metadata of the instruction’s
input operands, whether an error should be flagged to interrupt the continued
progress of the monitored application.
Because the functionality and the effectiveness of the checks in the exam-
ple monitoring approaches have been evaluated in previous research, we will
focus on evaluating the performance of the monitoring approaches, which are
determined by metadata accesses and propagation events.
Monitor Threat Metadata Propagation Ref.
Flow-source tracking tracking {T1, T2} for register {T1op1 ⊥ T1op2, [94, 46]
(FST) untrusted data and memory bytes T2op1 > T2op2}⇒ Dest (binary)
{T1op, T2op}⇒ Dest (unary)
Array Bounds Checking spatial memory {UB, LB} for register {UB, LB}⇒ Dest [11, 44]
(FBC) safety and memory words
Information Flow Control data Identifier for - [144, 161]
(IFC) confidentiality memory bytes
Table 5.1: Summary of example monitoring approaches. For FST, binary
operations include arithmetic and memory instructions, unary
operations include unary arithmetic instructions and move in-
structions. FBC encodes the intended referent of a pointer as the
high address (UB) concatenated with the low address (LB) of the
allocated memory chunk.
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Flow source tracking (FST)
FST is a taint-tracking approach that taints bytes in the monitored application
with a metadata value that encodes the source of the data. Unlike information
flow tracking, which uses a few bits of metadata [131, 41, 43] and must to resort
to fail-stop behavior (and are thus vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks), the
metadata managed by FST can enables analysis and recovery techniques [112].
Metadata Encoding: FST instruments system calls that read from IO to mark
each read from an untrusted input channel with a unique non-zero identifier
(X). The identifier indicates the time that the input arrived and marks the meta-
data for each byte of memory derived from the call with a metadata that en-
codes a range (X, X). This range-encoding increases the size of the metadata to a
double-word in size, but allows for transparent metadata propagation when an
instruction has multiple source operands that each has non-zero metadata.
Metadata Propagation: If the metadata of both of the operands are zero (to
indicate trustworthy data), then the destination metadata is also zero. However,
if either of the operands of an instruction have non-zero metadata, then the
non-zero metadata is propagated to the destination operand. In addition, if
both operands of an instruction has non-zero metadata, then the metadata of
the destination operand is updated with a range that captures a time span when
both inputs were read from untrusted inputs. In other words, for an instruction
with operands that have metadata (X, X) and (Y,Y), the destination metadata is
updated to (X,Y) if (X) originated from IO that occurred before (Y).
Used in this fashion, the metadata for a register or memory operand used in
a failed check can provide information of approximately the inputs from which
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the data was derived from. While the encoding is not lossless [94], it does pro-
vide a great deal of information about the origins of untrustworthy data.
Full Bounds Checking (FBC)
In the C programming language, a memory access error occurs when an ac-
cess through a pointer goes outside the bounds of the pointer’s intended ref-
erent. FBC detects such errors using a fat-pointer-based bounds-checking ap-
proach [11, 44]. FBC transparently maintains a double-word of metadata for
memory words in the monitored application and verifies that accesses using
pointers are within the bounds of the pointer’s intended referent. Unlike moni-
toring approaches that can function on a few bits of metadata, capability-based
approaches such as bounds checking inherently require a larger number of bits
to encode the address range of the intended referent.
Metadata Encoding: FBC instruments malloc calls that allocate memory to set
the metadata of the pointer returned by the call with the memory range of the
allocated memory range. For implicit allocation on the program stack that are
more difficult to discern at runtime, we leveraged compiler support [83] that
annotate these events to make them explicit. The metadata encoding consists of
a double-word that encodes the base and and bounds addresses of the allocated
memory chunk.
Metadata Propagation: Because the only legal operations on pointers are move
instructions and arithmetic with a non-pointer value, the metadata is propa-
gated by copying the metadata of the pointer to the destination.
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Information Flow Control (IFC)
IFC is based on prior work in information-flow security [144, 161, 32] that pro-
tect the confidentiality of user data. Information-flow security mechanisms use
metadata to explicitly label all values and storage locations in the monitored
application. High-level security policies can be defined by the labels encoded in
the metadata, a set of legal flows (pair of labels) that determine permitted flows,
and a set of privileges (consisting of labels) held by the monitored application.
In order to read from a memory location labeled (X), the process must add (X) to
the privileges it holds. However, if the process later attempts to store to (Y), the
access is allowed only if the (X → Y) can be permitted. In this approach, we as-
sume that the privileges held by the process are managed separately by trusted
software. Compared to software-only implementations of information-flow se-
curity, hardware support such as IFC can provide benefits such as improved
performance, smaller trusted code base, and security enforcement even if the
kernel becomes compromised [161].
Metadata Encoding To model the functionality of a system protected by IFC,
we instrument system calls that allocate memory to set the metadata of bytes in
the allocated chunk with a unique identifier. A larger metadata size reduces the
possibility of aliasing (and false negatives) that can occur in the set of identifiers
used. The metadata encoding used in our evaluation consists of a double-word,
which not only addresses aliasing but also allows identifiers to persist across
program invocations.
Metadata Propagation In contrast to FBC and FST, IFC does not propagate the
metadata between data in the monitored application. However, IFC will check
the accessed metadata on all memory reads and writes to ensure that the ac-
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cess is allowed by the security policy and used to update the process privileges.
These checks must be performed by software handlers but have low perfor-
mance overheads when hardware support is used to cache legal flows [161].
5.1.3 Locality Discussion
To determine the characteristics of metadata for the example runtime monitor-
ing approaches, we collected traces of metadata accesses when running a set
of C benchmarks in SPEC2000 and SPEC2006 with reference inputs. These
benchmark suites were chosen for the evaluation because they are compute
and memory-bound and more impacted by runtime monitoring than IO-bound
workloads. To keep storage requirements for the traces reasonable, each trace
was one and a half billion accesses in length. The following section discusses
some of the findings from an analysis of the metadata access patterns and the





















Figure 5.2: The average percentage of metadata accesses for zero for each

























Figure 5.3: The average percentage of metadata memory with zero for
each benchmark suite and runtime monitor.
In analyzing the behavior of metadata, we first noticed the abundance of
memory accesses for the default value, which is the case where the correspond-
ing memory location in the monitored application is not untrustworthy in FST,
not a pointer in FBC, or have default protection in IFC. Figure 5.2 shows that
accesses made for metadata with the default values account for a very large
percentage of memory accesses made by each runtime monitor. This is further
illustrated in Figure 5.3, which shows that a large percentage of the memory
space allocated for metadata contain default metadata memory values. These
graphs suggest that all three runtime monitors maintain metadata that exhibit
sparsity, where much of the metadata remains zero as the monitored application
executes; eliminating cache accesses for the default metadata value can circum-
vent a great deal of memory traffic.
Next, we attempted to observe the temporal locality of metadata accesses
by looking at the number of unique metadata values (that are not the default
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Figure 5.4: Cumulative percentage of metadata accesses for the most fre-
quently observed values - The X-axis shows the number of
most frequently observed values; the Y-axis shows the cumula-
tive percentage of metadata accesses where the most frequently
observed values are either read from or written to metadata
memory.
occurrence. Figure 5.4 shows the cumulative percentage of metadata memory
accesses made by the most frequently observed values in the metadata access
stream for each runtime monitor and benchmark suite. The results show that
the metadata for IFC and FBC exhibit low entropy, where more than 80% of
the metadata accesses are to the 25 most frequently observed metadata values.
This demonstrates the property of frequent value locality, where a small num-
ber of unique metadata values are used for a majority of memory accesses for
metadata.
Intuitively, the sparsity and value locality of metadata can be explained by
characteristics of hardware support for runtime monitoring, which will perform
operations in a transparent manner. This transparency is important for perfor-
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mance but can lead to extra metadata accesses for safety: metadata accesses
must shadow all application data accesses and will occur even if the metadata
had been checked already or is not relevant to the monitoring being performed.
(Even if the data is not relevant to the monitoring being performed, returning
zero metadata is simpler and more transparent than relying on software inter-
vention [100].) Further, many application operations will change the value of
data used by an application but leave the property for which the monitoring ap-
proach is checking for unchanged. As an example, an application variable that
is used as a loop iterator by a monitored application may have many permu-
tations over the course of execution, but for FBC, the metadata for the variable
remains unchanged because the variable is not a pointer.
Lastly, we analyzed the impact of runtime monitoring on the monitored ap-
plication’s performance as the metadata increased in size. For this study, we
compared the instruction throughput of the monitored application as the meta-
data increased for information flow tracking, which has high overheads from
performing propagation and checking for almost every instruction. Figure 5.5
shows the results of the study for 1 to 64 bits of metadata for each byte of mem-
ory in the monitored application, where 1 bit of metadata matches prior work
that marked data only as tainted or untainted [131] and larger metadata sizes
reflect the design of FST using 16- and 32-bit values to identify origins. The
analysis shows that while the use of 1 bit of metadata results in less than 10%
overhead on performance, increasing the metadata size leads to much higher
overheads in the monitored application. Furthermore, increasing the size of the
second-level metadata caches, which can be scaled up in size without impacting
the design of the upper levels, marginally reduces these overheads when scaled
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Figure 5.5: Overheads of information flow tracking for increasing meta-
data sizes normalized to when no monitoring is being per-
formed. The X-axis shows how increasing the size of
conventionally-organized second-level metadata caches affects
these overheads. Although 1-bit metadata had a low impact,
larger metadata sizes resulted in significant overheads on mon-
itored application performance. Increasing the size of the sec-
ond level cache, which can be scaled up without impacting the
design of the monitoring hardware, only slightly reduced these
overheads.
ber of metadata accesses that miss to memory and contend with traffic from the
main processing core. In particular, using 32-bit and 64-bit metadata led to 24x
and 43x average increases in the memory bandwidth usage of FST compared
to when 1-bit of metadata is used. In the remainder of this chapter, we eval-
uate optimizations that can reduce the overheads of large tags without greatly











Bus to memory controller
Figure 5.6: Block diagram of the metadata cache hierarchy using the
NDM-E cache.
5.2 Cache Optimizations
In this section, we will discuss the two approaches we designed and evaluated
for optimizing the metadata cache hierarchy. The first approach takes advantage
of the spatial locality observed in Section 5.1 to filter out unnecessary metadata
accesses. The second approach takes advantage of the frequent value locality in
metadata to compress metadata values stored in on-chip caches.
Filtering Accesses
To take advantage of the sparsity observed in Section 5.1, we propose to add 1-











Bus to memory controller
Figure 5.7: Block diagram of the metadata cache hierarchy using an NDM
cache.
aligned to the size of a cache line (64-bytes) and use this bit to filter out metadata
accesses. The benefit of using a bit for a memory chunk of a cache line in size
is that it enables recompression, which prior approaches for multi-granularity
memory tagging were unable to transparently perform [131, 161, 127]. When
cache lines are evicted from on-chip caches, the bit can be updated to ”recom-
press” the corresponding memory chunk. We will refer to this bit as the non-
default metadata (NDM) bit, which will be used to determine whether a mem-
ory chunk contains only default metadata values (0) or at least one non-default
value (1). We extended the baseline metadata management algorithm [100] to
allocate NDM bits in shared memory adjacent to the corresponding metadata.
In our evaluation, a page of allocated metadata requires 64 NDM bits for the
chunks contained within the page, and a page of NDM bits can hold mappings
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for 512 4KB pages of metadata.
Metadata caches can use NDM bits to filter out metadata accesses to default
metadata values in one of two possible ways. To take advantage of NDM bits,
we modified the cache controllers in the metadata cache hierarchy using one of
two possible approaches. These approaches can be distinguished by the level
of the cache hierarchy at which they operate at and how transparent they are to
the cache.
The first approach, which is shown in Figure 5.6, is named NDM with Eager
Read (NDM-E) and will ”eagerly” read the NDM bit of a metadata memory
chunk before the L1 cache is read. The NDM bits are stored in a cache structure
that is organized almost identically to the tag TLB. On each read, the NDM-E
cache returns a bit–the NDM bit–corresponding to the looked up address. If the
NDM bit of the accessed line is 0, indicating that the cache block contains only
default metadata values, then the cache read can be avoided. For cache writes
in NDM-E, the cache controller must first check the NDM bit of the written line.
If the bit is not set, then the first-level cache must first allocate a line for the
address. The allocation performed will also write the default metadata value
for each value contained within the cache line. After the write completes, the
NDM bit must be set so as to ensure that future reads from the cache line are
appropriately directed to the metadata cache hierarchy. For cache write-backs in
NDM-E, the written-back line will be checked for recompression. The second-
level cache will not be written if the line can be recompressed.
The second approach, which is shown in Figure 5.7, is named NDM and is
more transparent to the first-level caches than NDM-E. The NDM cache will
only be read if a metadata access misses in the last-level cache. If the NDM bit
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for the missed line is 0, then the cache controller will avoid the memory read
and allocate a cache line in the last level with all zeros. However, if the NDM bit
for the missed line is 1, then the access must be fulfilled from memory. Cache
writes in NDM are performed the same way as conventional caches because the
existence of NDM bits only affect off-chip memory accesses. Recompression is
performed on write-backs to memory.
NDM-E offers the advantage of more efficient usage of on-chip caches by
filtering out accesses that bring cache lines with default metadata values into the
on-chip caches. However, because NDM-E must access the NDM bits on each L1
metadata cache access, it suffers from potentially higher energy consumption.
If the NDM bit is checked before the L1 cache is read, NDM-E can also increase
the delay of the first-level cache. In the evaluation, we conservatively model
this as an additional cycle of delay.
Compressed Metadata
To take advantage of the frequent value locality observed in Section 5.1, we also
evaluated an approach that leverages value-based compression named dynamic
metadata compression (DMC). DMC attempts to compress double-word values
in a metadata cache line using a small dictionary and caching dictionary indices
when a cache line is found to be compressible. The example in Figure 5.10 illus-
trates when a cache line is compressible in this scheme. This optimization can
utilize on-chip cache space more efficiently given the fulfillment of two main
criteria. The first is that the dictionary is large enough to hold the most fre-
quently occurring values observed in the metadata working set. The second is












Bus to memory controller
Figure 5.8: Block diagram of the DMC cache compression scheme for
metadata in the on-chip last-level cache. The last-level cache
in this scheme is split into two halves that are equal in area in
order to store compressed and uncompressed data.
useful values. From the locality study of the benchmarks used in our evalua-
tion, we determined that a dictionary of 32 entries was sufficient, which also
allows metadata values to be compressed by a factor of 12.8X.
Previously proposed software-based approaches for frequent-value com-
pression on the main processing core are able to populate dictionary values
through values observed during short profiling phases [163]. This approach
is not applicable when the accesses are performed transparently by accelerator
hardware. DMC includes a simple hardware approach that caches values found
in cache traffic in an attempt to dynamically find values to use for compression.
This approach uses a candidate table, which tracks the frequency of occurrence





















Figure 5.9: Block diagram of the design for the DMC compression logic.
The compression data path is used during cache refills and
writebacks to compress values in the cache line. Even if the
line is not compressible, the candidate table is updated to track
the frequency of occurrence of metadata values. When a value
has been observed more than a certain number of times, it is
written to the dictionary and used for compression.
Index 00 01 10 11












Figure 5.10: Example of compression for an uncompressed cache line of
eight values and a dictionary with four values.
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cremented each time the value is observed. When the count reaches a threshold,
then the value will be copied to the dictionary for use in compression. We em-
pirically determined 64 as the threshold for our evaluation by testing a range of
threshold values. We found that smaller thresholds can result in the dictionary
becoming populated with values that were not the most frequently occurring
values for certain benchmarks; on the other hand, larger thresholds can result
in too few values being written into the dictionary. For many benchmarks, small
thresholds were sufficient as they resulted in the most cache hits for compressed
data. The effectiveness of small thresholds also reflects the frequent value local-
ity observed in Section 5.1.
On each write-back from the first-level cache and on a refill from memory,
each value in the cache line is evaluated in a hardware pipeline that compares
the value against the dictionary and candidate table entries. The pipeline can
be broken down into four high-level stages: read, check, allocate, and write.
In the read step, the uncompressed value in the cache line is used to index the
candidate table and the dictionary table, which can be built using a CAM ar-
ray [107] that asserts the index of the matching entry. In the check step, the
dictionary match determines whether the value is compressible; if the value
is not compressible, then the cache line is not compressible. The index of the
matching candidate table entry is used to access the candidate count array for
the candidate count. In the allocate step, the dictionary will be written with the
uncompressed value if there was a candidate table hit, the corresponding can-
didate count reached a saturated value, and the dictionary missed. If there was
a miss in the candidate table, then the candidate table replacement algorithm
will be used to find the candidate table entry in which the new value will be
written. In the write step, the candidate table is written, the candidate count
121
array is written with the incremented count, and the dictionary write (if any) is
performed.
For replacement, the candidate table uses the pseudo-LRU policy, and the
dictionary uses FIFO. We also evaluated Full-LRU and FIFO replacement poli-
cies for the candidate table and found that each policy performed similarly in
terms of the values that were written into the dictionary. For a subset of the
benchmarks, pseudo-LRU performed slightly better than FIFO in terms of the
number of cache lines that were compressed. The dictionary is populated using
FIFO replacement until it becomes full. To obviate the need to replace all cor-
responding compressed values when a dictionary entry is replaced, we block
all writes to the dictionary (and clock gate the compression hardware) after the
dictionary becomes full. However, between long-running phases of a program,
the set of metadata values that are useful for compression may be different. To
adapt to the difference in behavior between phases, a mechanism is needed to
age dictionary entries; this can be performed by periodically clearing the dic-
tionary and cache and re-training both arrays [163, 124]. In our evaluation, we
modeled the periodic clearing of the arrays by re-training each at the beginning
of a benchmark.
The remainder of this section will discuss how DMC caches compressed
and uncompressed data. For all cache lines that enter the last-level cache, the
cache controller will read the contents of the dictionary and attempt to match
each value to an existing entry using the compression pipeline. When a value
matches a dictionary entry, it is possible to compress the value, and the match-
ing dictionary index is buffered in a compressed line. If all metadata values in
an incoming cache line are compressible, then the line can be cached in com-
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pressed form. Otherwise, the original uncompressed cache line must be cached.
In DMC, both forms of data can be stored by separating the compressed and
uncompressed caches into equally-sized halves in terms of physical size. By
compressing incoming values into smaller dictionary indexes, the compressed
cache requires fewer data bits and can use the area saved by compression to
have a larger number cache lines. 1 When writing to the second level cache, after
the incoming line has been checked for compressibility, the compressed line is
steered towards the compressed cache, and an invalidation signal is sent to the
uncompressed cache for the same address. Otherwise, the cache line is steered
to the uncompressed cache, and an invalidation is sent to the compressed cache.
The invalidations are necessary to maintain mutual exclusion.
In operation, the compressed and uncompressed portions of the cache are
accessed in parallel for reads. Reads that hit in the uncompressed cache re-
turn the data directly. Reads that hit in the compressed cache will decompress
each value that is stored in the compressed line to reconstruct the uncompressed
cache line; this incurs a hit-delay penalty proportional to the number of values
in the cache line. To perform decompression, the dictionary is replicated and
read for decompression. Although the dictionary for compression must be or-
ganized as a fully-associative array for matching purposes, the replica can be a
simpler SRAM array that is addressed linearly. Compressed values in the line
are used in sequence to index the dictionary replica to find the uncompressed
value. Once the original uncompressed cache line is reconstructed, the line is
sent to the upper-level cache to complete the read. We modeled the delay for
performing decompression based on the assumption that a new value can be
read from the dictionary in each cycle.
















Figure 5.11: The evaluation framework used for the cache designs.
Main Core Conventional Base NDM-L NDM-E Compressed
L1 Size 6-Way, 24KB 2-Way, 4KB
L2 Size 8-Way, 512KB 8-Way, 128KB
L1 Delay (cycles) 3 1 1 1 (NDM hit) or 2 (NDM miss)
L2 Delay (cycles) 15 8 8 8 8
Compression Delay - 8 cycles
Decompression Delay - 8 cycles
TLB Size (entries) 16 L1, 64 L2
Block Size (bytes) 64
Memory Delay (cycles) 200
Benchmarks
SPEC2K: art bzip2 crafty equake gcc gzip mcf mesa parser perlbmk twolf vpr
SPEC2K6: gcc gobmk h264ref hmmer libquantum mcf milc perlbench
Table 5.2: Simulation parameters and benchmarks.
To evaluate the performance of metadata cache organizations, we used trace-
driven simulation and estimated the performance of monitored applications
with a simple (and conservative) timing model. The high-level flow of the sim-
ulation framework is shown in Figure 5.11. The runtime monitors are imple-
mented as analysis tools for the Pin [70] binary instrumentation framework;
and monitored applications are run with Pin to capture their behavior. Dur-
ing the course of execution of each monitored application, instruction counts,
memory addresses, and accessed metadata values are captured by the analy-
sis tools and stored to trace files. To cope with finite amounts of storage, the
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traces contain 1.5 billion metadata accesses for each application and monitoring
approach. The traces are then evaluated with a timing model that models the
cache and memory delays in more detail.
In the timing model, absent of stalls, the main processing core retires one
(non-memory) instruction in each cycle and forwards the retired instruction to
the runtime monitor using the Core-Fabric FIFO queue. Each runtime monitor
reads retired instructions from the queue and will access its own cache hierarchy
for the metadata of memory operands. When an access misses the first-level
cache, the core or monitor will stall and wait for the request to be fulfilled from
the lower levels. Table 5.2 summarizes the other parameters in the evaluation.
Latencies for the core caches were gathered from published numbers for the
Atom processor [35] and metadata cache latencies were collected from running
Cacti 6.5 [93].
To amortize the effects of initial transient behavior, we warmed up for one
billion accesses and collected statistics for the remainder of the traces using the
performance model. In additional, to get a better sense of the effectiveness of
DMC, we also compared its performance to an oracle approach that can popu-
late the dictionary using values that are profiled from each trace. In this oracle
approach, the dictionary for each benchmark is statically derived from profiling
the entirety of each trace and the same dictionary is used for compression for
the duration of the simulation.
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5.3.2 Performance
Figures 5.12(a), 5.12(b), and 5.12(c) show the CPI of monitored applications
normalized to a baseline where monitoring is off. From left to right, the graphs
show the effect on CPI of metadata cache organizations that use conventionally
organized metadata L2, NDM with a 128KB metadata L2, NDM-E with a 128KB
metadata L2, NDM-E with DMC that can cache 1K compressed lines and 1K
uncompressed lines, and NDM-E with cache compression using oracle knowl-
edge. To better differentiate the sources of performance overheads and how the
optimization affects each source, the CPI is broken down by the baseline ap-
plication performance, stalls from memory contention, and stalls from queue
wait. Memory contention reflects increases in delay for memory accesses from
the main processing core due to bandwidth contention with accesses from the
runtime monitor. Queue wait reflects cycles in which the main processing core
must stall because the queue between the main processing core and the runtime
monitor is full. The results show that queue wait accounts for the majority of
the performance overheads.
When comparing the performance across the evaluated monitoring tech-
niques that use a conventionally organized 128KB L2 metadata cache, IFC has
the highest slowdown at 3.6x. Unlike FBC and FST, which can filter more in-
structions that are not relevant to the monitoring performed, IFC has higher
slowdowns because it must monitor all memory accesses. By filtering mem-
ory accesses that are not performed at a word granularity, FBC has lower over-
heads than IFC at 2.2x. Lastly, because FST was customized for a small subset
of the x86 instructions that are relevant for security monitoring, it can filter out
a larger percentage of instructions and accesses and has the lowest performance
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overheads of the three at 1.9x.
For a cache hierarchy using a 128KB L2, adding a small cache of NDM bits
dramatically reduces the performance overheads of FST, while the performance
overheads of FBC and IFC are also improved. Compared to a 128KB L2, NDM
reduces the performance overheads of FST by 39.3%, FBC by 15.5%, and IFC by
21.5%. For all three monitoring approaches, the small 128KB metadata L2 cache
with NDM is able to attain performance that is comparable to using a much
larger (1MB) conventionally organized L2 metadata cache. Compared to NDM,
NDM-E is able to provide an additional 3% reduction in overheads for FBC, 13%
for IFC, and 8.9% for FST. When NDM-E is enabled, it can take full advantage
of the sparsity of FST metadata to reduce the performances to less than 3% on
average compared to when no monitoring is performed.
Lastly, the combination of NDM-E and DMC can further reduce the average
performance overheads by all three monitoring approaches and outperform a
much larger 1MB L2 conventional cache. Compared to NDM-E alone, the com-
bination of optimizations are able to reduce the performance overheads of FBC
by 24.8% and IFC by 13.3%. FST, whose performance overheads were already
very low with NDM-E, improves by another 1.0% when NDM-E and DMC are
both used. Compared to using a much larger 1MB conventional L2, NDM-E
and DMC improve the performance of FBC by 27%, FST by 35.2%, and IFC by
22.2%. Compared to when non monitoring is performed, the performance over-
heads of NDM-E and DMC are reduced from 117% to 33% for FBC, from 267%
to 117% for IFC, and from 86% to less than 3% for FST. We will also note that
for all three monitoring approaches, while the oracle approach for populating
the dictionary for compression outperformed DMC on average, the difference
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in performance was very small (less than 1%), indicating that it is almost as ef-
fective as profiling for finding the most frequently occurring metadata values
for these scenarios.
5.3.3 Metadata Access Delays
To better understand the effects of each of the optimizations, we also evalu-
ated the average latencies for metadata accesses made by runtime monitoring
approaches. Figures 5.13(a), 5.13(b), and 5.13(c) show the average metadata ac-
cess latencies for FBC, FST, and IFC with increasing conventional L2 metadata
caches sizes and with the proposed optimizations. For each of the evaluated
monitoring approaches that uses conventionally organized L2 metadata caches,
the delays were dominated by the contribution of metadata accesses that missed
to memory.
When NDM is enabled for FBC and IFC with a 128KB L2 metadata cache
and is used to filter memory traffic, the number of metadata accesses that miss
to memory is reduced to levels that are comparable to a much larger 1MB L2
metadata cache. For FST, NDM filters a much larger percentage of memory traf-
fic, which helps to reduce its performance overheads. When NDM-E is enabled
for FST and IFC, a large percentage of metadata accesses are diverted from both
the L1 and L2 metadata caches to the NDM cache. This helps to reduce the
pressure on the small metadata caches and further reduces the average delay
and the performance overheads of these monitoring approaches.
Lastly, NDM-E with DMC is able to further improve over NDM-E by virtu-
ally increasing the capacity of the L1 caches for FBC and IFC and reduce accesses
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to L2. Compared to NDM-E, DMC can convert more of the metadata accesses
that miss to memory to L2 metadata cache hits for FBC and IFC.
5.3.4 Area and Power Overheads
Component Capacity Area Energy/Access Static Energy
(um2) (pJ) (mW)
L1 Cache 4KB 348,553.2 25.6 78.2
L2 Cache
64KB 296,855 28.4 7.98
128KB 417,439.4 43.2 15.4
256KB 666,477.5 72.9 30.4
512KB 1,227,341.7 105.1 58.3
1MB L2 2,379,850 175.7 115.3
Compressed L2 20KB 100,873.5 23.6 3.8
DMC 64KB+64KB 39,7728.5 52.0 11.78
Table 5.3: Area and power of evaluated cache sizes for the 65nm technol-
ogy generation
In this section, we will discuss the area and power overheads of the NDM
and DMC; these overheads are low by design. In addition, we discuss these
overheads within the context of the area of the metadata caches, which have
area and power estimates shown in Table 5.3. The overheads were estimated
using Cacti [93].
For NDM and NDM-E, the primary area and power overheads stem from
the additional on-chip arrays for storing 64 NDM bits per memory page. Be-
cause NDM-E is designed to be accessed alongside the metadata TLBs, the area
can be kept small by re-using the TLB’s tag matching and decode logic to select
the corresponding NDM word. For a fully associative TLB with a CAM array
for tag matching and a SRAM array for holding the cached data, the addition
of the SRAM array for NDM-E will add minor overheads. Prior research has
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shown that the area of such caches is dominated by the CAM arrays, which
take up almost 5x as much area as an equivalent SRAM array [50]. Although
NDM-E introduces static power overheads, the reduction in metadata cache ac-
cesses for NDM-E can offset the dynamic power overheads. For NDM, the area
overheads can be greater, since NDM would require a duplication of the struc-
ture resembling the metadata TLB. However, NDM can still provide significant
energy savings by avoiding metadata accesses that miss to memory.
For DMC, the area overheads can be primarily attributed to the candidate
and dictionary arrays used for the compressor. A straightforward implemen-
tation of the compression logic using 32x32 CAMs [66]–two for the dictionary,
and eight for the candidate array–would result in an area overhead of roughly
230,000µm2. Table 5.3 also shows that the additional cache used in DMC for
storing compressed data would consume another 100,000µm2. However, when
compared to a much larger 1MB conventionally-organized L2 cache, which
DMC would out-perform, the compression logic and DMC caches are nearly 4x
smaller. In terms of energy and power, although conventional CAM designs im-
plemented using NOR matching cells would consume significant power, these
overheads can be reduced by either 1) implementing the CAM array using a
NAND topology [107] (at the cost of longer compression latencies); or 2) by
simplifying the design to use less associative arrays (at the cost of possibly us-






















































































Figure 5.12: Normalized performance of applications with runtime mon-
itoring enabled across different metadata cache sizes, NDM,
NDM-E, DMC, and DMC with oracle dictionary. The same
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Figure 5.13: Breakdown of metadata access latencies and contributions of
hits at different levels of the metadata memory hierarchy with
runtime monitoring enabled across different metadata cache
sizes, NDM, NDM-E, DMC, and DMC with oracle dictionary.
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated optimizations for the metadata memory hierar-
chy of a Harmoni-based system for runtime monitoring that can transparently
perform monitoring using large medata. To motivate the optimizations, we ana-
lyzed the characteristics of metadata for several runtime monitoring approaches
that use large tags and found two distinct characteristics of the metadata used
for bookkeeping and checking. In particular, we found that metadata tends to
be sparse and take on a small handful of unique values over the course of typ-
ical applications. To take advantage of these characteristics, we proposed two
lightweight hardware optimizations on the metadata cache hierarchy: NDM
cache to take advantage of the sparsity, and DMC to take advantage of the value
locality. The evaluation of the proposed approaches showed that NDM allows a
metadata cache hierarchy using a 128KB L2 to perform similarly to a system that
uses a conventional L2 cache that is 8x larger and the combination of NDME and
DMC can outperform a system that uses a conventional 1MB L2 cache by 22.2%-
35.2%. Overall, the NDME and DMC can reduce the performance overheads of
runtime monitoring with large tags from 86-267% to 3-117% of a baseline design




Runtime monitoring is a promising approach for security and reliability.
However, whereas both flexibility and efficiency are important for runtime
monitoring implementations, there is currently a tradeoff between these char-
acteristics. In this thesis, we built a framework for runtime monitoring that can
bridge this gap between flexibility and efficiency. The FlexCore and Harmoni
architectures demonstrated how to leverage reconfigurable hardware for map-
ping hardware implementations runtime monitoring functions with low perfor-
mance overheads on monitored applications. In this chapter, we will summarize
the key contributions of this thesis.
In Chapter 3, we introduced an initial implementation of the runtime mon-
itoring framework named FlexCore. The primary contribution of the work in
this chapter was showing how an island-style, bit-level reconfigurable fabric
can be employed to achieve the desired characteristics of both flexibility and
efficiency for runtime monitoring. Using a reconfigurable fabric that had 50%
of the area of the baseline processor, FlexCore had the flexibility to implement
a broad spectrum of monitoring functions ranging from simple memory checks
to more in-depth checking of computation in the monitored application. By
implementing the runtime monitoring features to bit-level reconfigurable hard-
ware, the approach improves in efficiency in comparison with software-only
and multiprocessor implementations of runtime monitoring approaches. While
a custom-hardware based implementation is still better in terms of performance,
the FlexCore architecture manages to close the gap for embedded applications
by filtering instructions that are not relevant to the monitoring being performed
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and selectively incorporating dedicated hardware units in the reconfigurable
fabric. Overall, we were able to limit the performance overheads of runtime
monitoring to less than 20% for a majority of evaluated approaches.
However, for runtime monitoring approaches that are not able to keep pace
with the frequency of the main processing core when mapped to the recon-
figurable fabric, the performance overheads of runtime monitoring on Flex-
Core became more significant. To work through these limitations, we explored
two methods to reduce the performance overheads of the runtime monitoring
framework.
Harmoni was proposed in Chapter 4 that replaces the island-style bit-level
reconfigurable fabric of FlexCore with a more customized accelerator that is
more purpose-built for tagging. The primary contribution of the work in this
chapter was showing how many runtime monitoring approaches are built on
the notion of tagging, where software correctness problems are tracked and
verified using metadata that shadows data in the application. By taking advan-
tage of this observation, we are able to restrict the programmability of the co-
processor without constraining the important classes of monitoring approaches
that it is able to implement. Harmoni is able to achieve much higher frequencies
by using a more custom hardware to manipulate the metadata, while retaining
flexibility by still being able to implement most of the example monitoring ap-
proaches evaluated on FlexCore. The higher throughput of Harmoni reduces
its performance overheads to less than 10% for processing core that can run at
a few GHz. Further, the increased frequency and throughput of Harmoni al-
lows it to keep pace with larger, higher performance, and more power hungry
processing cores.
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Monitoring approaches built on the notion of tagging must also access and
manage metadata in shared main memory. When the metadata is more than a
few bits in size, accessing the metadata can become a more significant source of
performance overheads and hardware cost. In Chapter 5, we studied the char-
acteristics of metadata maintained by several example monitoring approaches
that can transparently manage and use larger metadata values. Through the
study, we found that the metadata maintained by these approaches exhibited
the characteristics of sparsity and frequent value locality. The primary con-
tribution of the work in this chapter was showing how these characteristics
can be leveraged to more efficiently cache metadata in small on-chip caches
and to reduce the memory bandwidth used to move metadata between on-chip
caches and shared main memory. To take advantage of sparsity, we proposed
an NDM cache, which can filter and compress metadata accesses for default
values. For frequent value locality, we proposed DMC, an approach that uses
dynamic dictionary-based compression to reduce the in-cache representation of
values stored in the last-level metadata cache. The combination of approaches
are more lightweight than increasing the size of the last-level cache in the meta-
data cache hierarchy. Our evaluation of the approaches, which are orthogonal
and can easily be combined, showed that they can dramatically reduce the num-
ber of metadata cache accesses that miss to memory and reduce the performance
overheads of runtime monitoring with large metadata values from 86-267% to
3-117%.
Going forward, as hardware designs and the correctness issues they address
increase in complexity, greater automation and faster implementation can be vi-
tal for the effectiveness of the designs shown in this work. Because many of
the examples approaches shown in this work were interpreted from prior art
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and manually implemented and optimized for the monitoring frameworks, av-
enues of future work are for compilation tools to automatically map software
implementations of runtime monitoring approaches (implemented on debug-
ging frameworks such as Valgrind [122] or Pin [70]) onto the co-processing fab-
rics proposed in this work.
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